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This research identifies that the problems in the structure and finances of the non-
metropolitan county of Avon led Richard Cottrell to attempt to recraft transport 
governance and stimulate urban regeneration using a unique expression of neoliberal 
ideas. This led to a private company called Advanced Transport for Avon to attempt 
to build and control a metro system in the city of Bristol without involvement from either 
tier of local government. Whilst this project was unsuccessful, it was an expression of 
neoliberalism far more than government neoliberal policies for regeneration at this 
time, such as enterprise zones and urban development corporations. The project also 
had key influences on the urban design of the city, attitudes to the automobile and 
cycling infrastructure both locally and nationally which, until now have been 
underappreciated. This work charts the extremities and limitations of the neoliberal 
agenda through the 1980s and early 1990s and the conditions for and consequences 
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The city of Bristol has long suffered from traffic chaos with frequent gridlock, 
long journey times and high levels of congestion. A Department for Transport report in 
2015 has identified that the city is the most congested in the United Kingdom.1 Despite 
many proposed solutions throughout the post-war period, including the construction of 
elevated walkways separating pedestrian and automobile, or the filling in its harbour 
to construct an inner ring road, the city has never fully dealt with its traffic problems. 
This research will look at one of these proposed, but never implemented, solutions, 
the Avon Metro. The work seeks to answer several key questions from studying the 
Avon Metro about changing attitudes to the automobile and the changing nature of 
urban government through the emergence of neoliberal urbanism and its limitations 
between the years 1979 and 1992. 
The Avon Metro was the idea of the newly elected Member of the European 
Parliament for the Bristol area, Richard Cottrell. In 1979, in conjunction with British 
Rail and architectural consultancy firm Whicheloe Macfarlane, he published plans to 
tie together the disparate railway infrastructure around Bristol with a new piece of 
underground railway running underneath the city centre. This would create a fast and 
efficient commuter network running from the suburbs to the city centre which the 
gridlocked city desperately needed.2 Supporting this would be a realigned bus system 
to bring passengers to the stations creating a fully integrated transport network.3  
                                                             
1 Laura Churchill, ‘Bristol still the most congested city in the country as traffic moves at slowest speeds in years’, 
Bristol Post [Online], 17th August 2015, available at: http://www.bristolpost.co.uk/news/motoring/bristol-still-
most-congested-city-4153 accessed 1st June 2017. 
2 Avon Metro: Initial Study, Bristol: Whicheloe Macfarlane Partnership (1979), p. 12., Y5853374, Bristol Central 
Lending Library.  




Between 1979 and 1986, however, Cottrell was unable to convince Avon 
County Council, which held statutory responsibility for transport policy in the area, to 
adopt his idea for a metro and develop it further.4 Undeterred, in November 1986 
Cottrell became the frontman for a company called Advanced Transport for Avon 
(ATA). Appointing himself as Chairman and Brian Tucker, from Whicheloe Macfarlane, 
as Managing Director. They aimed to take the ideas ‘left on the shelf’ by the County 
Council and construct the metro themselves using only private finance, offering a ‘free 
gift to the city of Bristol’ that would not seek any government subsidy or funding.5 
Changing the proposed mode of the metro from an underground railway to a street-
running tramway, ATA aimed to submit three private bills to Parliament to obtain 
powers to compulsory purchase land and construct the system. In doing so it became 
the first private company to submit bills for passenger railway construction since the 
grouping of railway companies in the 1920s. The company therefore, embraced the 
changing political and economic landscape of the 1980s which championed private 
enterprise and sought to reduce the powers of local government by constructing a 
public transportation system that was outside of the control of the local authorities.  
The company was successful in gaining royal assent for the first bill, which 
authorised the first stage of the system in 1989 but in 1992 the company was declared 
bankrupt without construction having been started. This left the city of Bristol without 
its metro system. This research seeks to explore the Avon Metro concept through the 
fourteen years of its existence to answer three key questions. 
                                                             
4 Avon County Council, Minutes of the Planning and Highways Committee of Avon County Council, 21st November 
1979, p. 1472-1473, ACC/M/PH/26 Bristol Archives. 
5 Michael Lord, ‘£350m Metro is back in town’, Evening Post, 10th November 1986, p. 3.; Richard Cottrell, ‘We 
must not turn our backs on the future’, Evening Post, 23rd November 1987, p. 6-7.; ‘Is this a free gift to the 





The first research question is ‘how did the Avon Metro reflect the changing 
environment of governance in the city from 1979 to 1992?’ The work will examine the 
structure of governance for a city situated within a non-metropolitan county and 
explore the problems this caused for transport governance. It will explore attempts to 
solve these problems which eventually became embodied with the Avon Metro 
proposals. This presented an alternative framework for transport governance which 
eventually took on neoliberal principles in its design. The work will examine how urban 
governance developed in reaction to this through the objectives of different 
stakeholders both locally and nationally.  
The second research question asks what does the development of the metro 
show about the changing nature of the city due to the emergence of neoliberalism and 
the limitations of this agenda in the period 1979 – 1992? The work examines how the 
metro reflected the changing economic climate of the city in these years from originally 
envisioned as a tool to help the city develop following deindustrialisation to becoming 
an expression of neoliberalism that reflected the changing economic landscape of the 
1980s and early 1990s. The work will explore why the ATA project was so radical and 
why there was such voracious opposition to it before its ideas started to become 
embraced by 1992 just before the companies collapse. The work will explore the 
model of neoliberal regeneration put forward by the company to identify the limitations 







The last research question this research seeks to answer is ‘in what way did 
the Avon Metro show a shifting attitude towards mobility and the automobile between 
the years 1979 and 1992?’ The work will examine the changing focus of metro systems 
in the United Kingdom from use primarily as a tool to improve mobility for those without 
a car towards becoming primarily an aid for cutting road congestion. It will examine 
the reasons why modern mass-transit systems were first implemented as underground 
systems before later systems being built as street-running tramways during the 1980s. 
Then exploring how mass-transit concepts continued to evolve after this and the Avon 
Metro’s role in all these changes. It will also examine how, despite a growing 
recognition of the need to restrain the impact of the car, alternatives were often forced 
to compete over scant resources. The work examines the Avon Metro’s role in these 
changing attitudes locally and nationally to appraise the importance of this proposed 














Firstly, for this research it is important to consider mobility and the automobile. 
Urry has identified the importance of mobility, from increasing social capital amongst 
individuals, to its effect on GDP and its importance in enabling access to services and 
facilities. Urry makes a strong connection between public spending on mobility, GDP 
per capita, individual income per person and mobility rights and access.6 The ability to 
move and who can move has great ramifications for wealth, social status and position. 
A key focus of Urry’s work is the concept of automobility with the car becoming 
entrenched in everyday life creating a ‘car culture’, providing status and becoming 
predominant to the point where it sub-ordinates other ‘public’ mobilities possessing 
power far beyond being just another mode of transport.7 
Gunn has examined the rise of the automobile in the post-war period, identifying 
that easier access to credit, development of overspill housing developments and the 
newfound freedom the car represented as the key reasons for the rise of popular mass 
ownership of the automobile.8 Pooley additionally attributed the rise of the car to the 
decline of Public Transport in this period.9 Attempts to rationalise dealing with the 
growing impact of the motorcar led to the publication of Buchanan’s ‘Traffic in Towns’ 
in 1963 which marked a watershed moment in how the motorcar was perceived. 
Buchanan focused on how urban centres could accommodate the increasing amount 
of traffic effectively and the changes required to achieve this. Despite cities such as 
Leeds, Newcastle and Glasgow starting to radically redesign their city centre layouts, 
                                                             
6 John Urry, Mobilities, (Cambridge:  Polity Press, 2007) pp.191-192, 200, 205, 207. 
7 Urry (2007), pp115 - 116, 133.; John Urry, ‘Inhabiting the car’, Sociological Review, 54-1 (2006), 18. 
8 Simon Gunn, ‘People and the Car: The expansion of Automobility in Urban Britain c.1955 – 70’, Social History 
38-2 (2013), 228 & 232. 
9 Colin Pooley, ‘Landscapes without the Car: A Counterfactual Historical Geography of Twentieth Century 




as well as central government policy following a ‘predict and provide’ model of road 
building to cater for the car, high levels of congestion continued to build within the 
urban centre in the following decades.10 This showed an inability to deal effectively 
with the unrestricted growth of the automobile in the urban centre. The impact of 
unrestricted car growth can be seen through the work of Pooley, Turnball and Adams, 
who have examined the rise in the use of the motorcar for journeys to school between 
1975 and 2001 identifying the decline of walking and cycling as a mode of travel, whilst 
a similar study by Pooley and Turnbull has identified similar results around the journey 
to work.11 These studies validate Urry’s argument about the car subordinating all other 
forms of ‘public’ mobilities. 
Such was the durability of Buchanan’s ideas, ‘Traffic in Towns’ has become the 
key report on the relationship between the automobile and urban planning. Gunn 
identified the long-term impact of ‘Traffic in Towns’ was that it started to turn public 
opinion against the motorcar due to its impact on cities, as displayed by the 
development of anti-urban motorway movements in Leeds and Leicester. Urry 
expands on this theme, arguing that the realisation of urban pollution and energy use 
in car production and use meant that the automobile started to become a political 
concern from the mid-1970s.12 Following ‘Traffic in Towns’, there were increased 
attempts to minimise the impact of the car on the city or design it out altogether. 
Ortolano has explored one case in his study of one early design for Milton Keynes, 
                                                             
10 Colin Buchanan, Traffic in Towns (London: Penguin, 1963), p. 38.; Simon Gunn, ‘The Buchanan Report, 
Environment and the Problem of Traffic in 1960s Britain’, Twentieth Century British History, 22-4 (2011), 538, 
541.; Susan Owens, ‘From ‘predict and provide’ to ‘predict and prevent’?: Pricing and Planning in Transport 
Policy’, Transport Policy, 2-1 (1995), 44. 
11 Colin G Pooley, Jean Turnbull and Mags Adams, ‘The journey to school in Britain since the 1940s: continuity 
and change’, Area, 37 (2005), 44.; Colin G Pooley and Jean Turnbull, ‘The Journey to work: a century of change’, 
Area, 31-3 (1999), 288.   




which included an extensive monorail system replacing the need for the car.13 Yet, for 
most cities, alternatives to the automobile centred around improving existing bus and 
rail provision which Cullinane has indicated became the most popular way to deal with 
congestion after years of neglect.14 The largest cities received powers to improve 
public transport through the Transport Act (1968) allowing them to co-ordinate different 
forms of public transportation through the creation of Passenger Transport Executives 
(PTEs). These powers were enhanced by the Local Government Act (1972) when their 
boundaries were linked to the new metropolitan counties. Beatty and Haywood 
identified that the creation of the PTEs was due to a realisation, following ‘Traffic in 
Towns’, that greater coordination of public transport was needed.15 The metropolitan 
counties started to develop metro systems - firstly using light rail, with an underground 
section through the urban centre, as seen in the Tyne and Wear Metro opened in 
1980, and later by street-running tramways, as seen in Manchester and Sheffield. 
Knowles and Ferbrache have identified that metro systems help to regenerate central 
business districts, boost employment, land and property prices and improve the quality 
of the city environment.16 This change in emphasis from underground railway to 
tramway systems followed the deregulation of the bus industry in 1986 which Beatty 
and Haywood identified were pursued as they still allowed direct surface city-centre 
access via a mode of transport still under the control of the PTEs, rail.17  
 
                                                             
13 Guy Ortolano, ‘Planning the urban future in 1960s Britain’, The Historical Journal, 54-2 (2011), 478. 
14 Sharon Cullinane, ‘Attitudes towards the car in the UK: Some implications for policies on congestion and the 
environment’, Transport Research Part A: Policy and Practice, 26-4 (1992), 299.  
15 Christina Beatty and Russell Haywood, ‘Changes in travel behaviour in the English Passenger Transport 
Executives’ areas 1981 – 1991’, Journal of Transport Geography, 5-1 (1997), 61 & 63.  
16 R.D. Knowles and Fiona Ferbrache, ‘Evaluation of wider economic impacts of light rail investments on cities’, 
Journal of Transport Geography, 54 (2016), 430. 




Another form of transport that began to re-emerge during this period was the 
bicycle. Aldred has identified that the bicycle remained invisible and unprotected within 
transport policy during the 1980s.18 Yet, professional cycling advocacy had started to 
emerge, which Parsons and Vigar identified was due to the need to resist automobile 
modernism.19 One example of the success of this advocacy during this period was the 
construction of the Bristol to Bath Railway Path, a segregated pedestrian and cycle 
route along a disused railway line between the two cities, by the local cycling advocacy 
group ‘Cyclebag’.20 There was also a greater understanding into the early 1990s, 
argued by Owens, of the problems unchecked proliferation of the automobile had 
caused on the environment with this hegemony being challenged for the first time.21 
This process has continued towards the present day where it has been argued that 
the dominance of the car is becoming challenged even further with ‘multi-modal’ travel 
styles, the ‘de-privatisation’ of car travel and a shifting priority by central and local 
governments towards other transport modes with debate as to whether ‘peak car’ has 
been reached.22 This research explores the development of changing ideas around 
transport policy between 1979 and 1992 to identify the role of the Avon Metro in this 
shifting attitude towards the automobile. 
 
 
                                                             
18 Rachel Aldred, ‘Governing transport from welfare state to hollow state: The case of cycling in the UK’, 
Transport Policy, 23 (2012), 98.  
19 Rorie Parsons and Geoff Vigar, “Resistance was futile!’ Cycling’s discourses of resistance to UK automobile 
modernism 1950-1970’, Planning Perspectives, (2017), 2. 
20 Richard Tibenham, ‘Sustrans: The National Cycle Network’, Local Economy: The Journal of Local Economy Policy 
Unit, 16-3 (2001), 252. 
21 Owens, (1995), 48. 
22 Judith Green, Rebecca Steinbach, Emma Garnet, Nicola Christie and Lindsay Prior, ‘automobility reconfigured? 





 Next, it is important to consider the development of structural governance in the 
city. The creation of the metropolitan counties were the culmination of local 
government reforms in the 1960s and 1970s that John has argued transformed local 
government from a complex patchwork of authorities that extended back to 1884 and 
1894 to the large professional counties of today.23 Heywood identified that the creation 
of the PTEs and the metropolitan counties gave the right structure for effective land 
use transport planning integration at conurbation level with effective integration 
between bus and rail services.24 Barbara Castle, Minister of State for Transport when 
these reforms were introduced, reflected 25 years after their introduction that they 
were the right tools to implement effective integration, co-ordination and rationalisation 
of local transport policy.25 The city of Bristol, however, did not receive this structure 
instead being subsumed into the non-metropolitan county of Avon. This contained the 
cities of Bristol and Bath as well as the large surrounding rural areas. Hagman 
criticised this form of settlement stating that ‘development plans would have to conform 
to a policy plan prepared by a bunch of rural country bumpkins who knew about 
greenbelts and cows, but were not much practiced in new-sophisticated planning’.26 
Bristol, therefore, lacked the correct type of governmental structure to meet its needs, 
but there is lacking in the historiography any in-depth study of the problems this caused 
for transport governance and financing in the non-metropolitan counties.  
                                                             
23 Peter John, ‘The Great Survivor: The Persistence and Resilience of English Local Government’, Local 
Government Studies, 40-5 (2014), 692-693. 
24 Russell Haywood, ‘Mind the gap: Town Planning and Manchester’s local railway network: 1947-1996’, 
European Planning Studies, 6-2 (1998), 195. 
25 Baroness Castle, ‘25 years of the passenger transport authorities and executives’, Passenger Transport 
Executive Group, p. 1. [online], available at: www.urbantransportgroup.org/system/files/general-
docs/25YearsofPTEs.pdf accessed 25th June 2017.   
26 Donald G Hagman, ‘English Planning and Environmental Law and Administration: The 1970s’, Journal of the 
American Planning Association 46-2 (1980), 167.; R.D. Knowles, ‘Transport impacts of Greater Manchester’s 
Metrolink light rail system’, Journal of Transport Geography, 4-1 (1996), 3.; Iain Docherty, ‘Rail transport policy-
making in UK Passenger Transport Authority Areas’, Journal of Transport Geography, 8 (2000), 158.; Beatty and 




Local government underwent further change in the 1980s. John argued that 
central government intervention in local governance began during the financial crises 
of the 1970s.27 Whilst Hill pinpointed that these began a process of controls being 
imposed by central government on public expenditure and local authority spending.28 
The changes introduced by the Thatcher government would have a large effect on 
local governance as central government sought to reduce the power and influence of 
elected local authorities by transferring many of their functions to single-purpose 
agencies as seen in the Urban Development Corporations (UDCs).29 This was done 
partially to enhance central government control, particularly over the Labour-led 
metropolitan counties, abolished along with the Greater London Council (GLC) in 
1985, with Chandler arguing that Thatcher believed that local governments should be 
the agents of central government.30 As such, local government should follow the 
governments neoliberal reforms and encouragement of the private sector to step-in 
where the frontiers of the state were being rolled back. John argues that conflict 
occurred due to the radicalisation of local council policies in reaction to these radical 
central government policies.31 Haughton and While argue that by the 1990s the 
structures of local governance had been radically altered, whilst Leach and Game 
identify that the key events in this were the abolition of the metropolitan councils and 
the GLC in 1985 and the setting up of the UDCs which both reduced the role of local 
government whilst centralising state control.32 John, however, argues against this 
                                                             
27 John, (2014), 693. 
28 Dilys M. Hill, Values and Judgments: The Case of Planning in England since 1947’, International Political Science 
Review 1-2 (1980), 157. 
29 Huw Thomas and Rob Imrie, ‘Urban Development Corporations and Local Governance in the UK’, Journal of 
Economic and Social Geography’, 88-1 (1997), 54-55. 
30 J.A. Chandler, Explaining local government, Manchester University Press: Manchester (2007), p. 243. 
31 John, (2014), 693-694. 
32 Graham Haughton and Aiden While, ‘From Corporate City to Citizens City? – Urban Leadership after Local 
Entrepreneurialism in the United Kingdom’, Urban Affairs Review, 35-1 (1999), 7.;  Steve Leach and Chris Game, 




stating that at the end of the decade local government had broadly the same levels of 
finance and were often at the centre of new networks created by government reform.33 
This research will seek to contextualise this process of change within a non-
metropolitan county to explore how these changes were further complicated by 
multiple tiers of governance. In addition to this, the research will examine how 
neoliberal reforms were positioned as the answer to problems of governance and 
finance to help provide a more effective transport policy in a non-metropolitan county 
during this period. 
It is also important to consider the emergence of neoliberalism, urban 
neoliberalism and its limitations. Neoliberal ideas emerged in the late 1940s as a 
backlash against prevailing collectivist ideologies through the formation of the Mont 
Pelerin Society before being fostered in Britain throughout the 1950s and 1960s by 
the One Nation Group and Bow Group in the Conservative Party, then by the Institute 
of Economic Affairs and the Centre for Policy Studies 34 The collapse of the Bretton 
Woods international monetary system, industrial decline, stagflation and the oil shock 
of 1973 have all been identified by Jones as reasons for politicians looking for an 
alternative policy agenda. Of which the likes of Hayek, von Mises, Friedman, Stigler 
and James Buchanan espoused and what would become known as neoliberalism. 
From the mid-1970s, he argues, neoliberal insights into macroeconomic management 
and regulation began to seep into policies in both Great Britain and the United States 
before being transformed into electorally successful programs under Thatcher and 
                                                             
County Councils’, Public Administration, 69-2 (1991) 141-170.; Iain Deas, Brain Robson and Michael Bradford, 
‘Re-thinking the Urban Development Corporation ‘experiment’: the case of Central Manchester, Leeds and 
Bristol’, Progress in Planning, 54 (2000) 1-72.; Mark Sandford, ‘Public Services and Local Government: The end 
of the Principle of ‘funding following duties’’, Local Government Studies, 42-4 (2016), 648 – 649. 
33 John, (2014), 693-694. 
34 Rachel Turner, Neo-Liberal Ideology: History, Concepts and Policies, (Edinburgh Scholorship Online: Edinburgh, 




Reagan from 1979 and 1980.35 Turner explains that whilst neoliberals differ amongst 
themselves on the details, all neoliberals support four generic principles or beliefs: 
firstly, the importance of the market as the essential component for efficiently 
allocating resources and safeguarding individual freedom, secondly, the commitment 
to a Rechtsstaat (rule of law state) whereby the state’s function is to secure social 
cohesion and stability through the preservation of individual liberties, thirdly, the 
advocacy of a strong but minimal state that intervenes only where necessary to secure 
law and order and safeguard the market order, and fourth, the dominant principle of 
full private ownership of the means of production.36 Davis and Walsh argue that 
Neoliberalism emerged both as a political project, enacted through state institutions 
and as a broader set of ideas and values such as individualism, laissez faire 
economics and free choice.37 Peck and Tickerell argue that the 1980s and early 1990s 
was a period of ‘roll-back’ neoliberalism, defined as a period of institutional searching 
and experimentation within restrictive and ultimately destructive parameters before a 
second period of ‘roll-out’ neoliberalism characterised by the third-way ideas of the 
Clinton and Blair administrations whereby the failings of Thatcher and Reagan’s ideas 
around neoliberalism were responded to. 38  
Despite becoming the predominant political and economic ideology of our time, 
Peck argues that it is wrong to reduce neoliberalism to some singular essence. 
Arguing that it has been formed by, and reacted to, the conditions within which it has 
been adopted; existing only in an impure form, or what he terms, messy hybrids.39 
                                                             
35 Daniel Stedman Jones, Masters of the Universe: Hayek, Friedman, and the Birth of Neoliberal Politics, 
(Princeton University Press: New Jersey), 1-2, 5-6. 
36 Turner, (2012), p. 5-6.  
37 Aeron Davis and Catherine Walsh, ‘Distinguishing Financialisation from Neoliberalism’, Theory, Culture and 
Society, 34, (2017), 29. 
38 Jaime Peck and Adam Tickell, ‘Neoliberalizing Space’, Antipode, 34, (2002), 385-390. 




Harvey meanwhile deposits that neoliberalisation can be interpreted as either a 
utopian project to realise a theoretical design for the reorganisation of international 
capitalism or as a political project to re-establish the conditions for capital 
accumulation and to restore the power of economic elites, who had been constrained 
by the Keynesian settlement and agreement with the labour force. He argues that 
whilst it is the former which is often presented as justification for the implementation 
of neoliberalisation policies, it has not been effective in revitalising global capital 
accumulation but has succeeded in restoring, or creating, in the cases of Russian 
oligarchs, the power of an economic elite.40 Brenner and Theodore argue that 
neoliberalism is a process, does not exist in a pure state, hinges on the active 
mobilisation of state power, generates path-dependent outcomes (as in it relies on 
what has gone previously), is contested, exacerbates regulatory failure and continues 
to evolve.41  
This research seeks to test some of these statements by providing a 
contextualised example of experimentation with neoliberalism in the city of Bristol in 
the 1980s and 1990s and its destructive potential on the governmental models. The 
research will explore a unique hybrid of neoliberalism which was created in the city as 
the project sought to adapt to the local conditions and examine whether the metro was 
a utopian or political project. The research will examine how the Avon Metro relied on 
what had gone previously in its conception and examine the contested nature of the 
project and how it exacerbated regulatory failure both nationally and locally. 
 
                                                             
40 David Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism, (Oxford Univeristy Press: Oxford, 2005), p.14 – 19. 




Hall argues that neoliberal concepts began to seep into urban design from the 
1970s as a response to industrial decline following recessions in the 1970s and early 
1980s. This resulted in urban planning being turned away from plans and regulations 
and towards encouraging urban growth through any means, resulting in policies such 
as Enterprise Zones and the Urban Development Corporations.42 Geddes argues that 
institutions and practices of governance at a local level have been transformed by 
neoliberalism with destructive restructuring towards a greater emphasis on releasing 
productive potential, economic growth and competitiveness and shifting the balance 
towards capital and away from labour. This ‘neoliberalisation of urban space’ created 
new forms of local governance such as elite ‘networked’ forms of governance based 
on public-private partnerships, new ‘public management strategies’, privatisations and 
competitive contracting of municipal services.43 Harvey adds that with the shift from 
managerialism to entrepreneurialism, and its evolving implementation, the way was 
open for a person of vision tenacity or skill to put a particular stamp on the nature and 
direction of urban entrepreneurism to shape it or for a mix personalities and institutions 
to put a project together.44  
Wetherall argues that the enterprise zone is arguably the neoliberal city’s purest 
policy expression and that these zones were intended by the inner-circles of the 
Conservative Party to act as ‘laboratories’ for incubating a new kind of economics and 
were criticised by the left-wing as acting as trojan horses for free-market 
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deregulation.45 Deas, Robson and Bradford have examined in-depth the role and 
effectiveness of the Urban Development Corporations arguing that they were only 
partially effective despite being hailed as having a transformative role in urban 
development. Their work argues that whilst physically the areas were transformed 
there were questions about the durability of these regenerations.46 Whereas the 
historiography overwhelmingly focuses on Enterprise Zones and Urban Development 
Corporations as expressions of urban neoliberalism, this research looks at another 
contemporary, and until now unexamined attempt, to institute a neoliberal framework. 
If successful, this model could have been replicated elsewhere. The ATA project was, 
therefore, an additional ‘laboratory’ for a new form of economics which has been 
overlooked by historians. This model used both path-dependant outcomes and a 
different and innovative form of financing to solve the lack of infrastructure within the 
city. This made it to a large extent much more significant as the purest form of 
neoliberal policy expression than even the enterprise zones that Wetherall argues. 
Lastly it is important to consider studies on the Avon Metro itself. No academic 
studies of the development of the Avon Metro exist despite its legacy on the history of 
transport in the city of Bristol. There have been smaller studies of the project however, 
including a short history of the project in the work ‘Unbuilt Bristol’ by Eugenie Byrne. 
Here he argues that political opposition, the economic downturn and the emergence 
of Badgerline’s alternative Guided Light Transit system were the reasons for the 
schemes failure.47 In addition, Oliver Green’s book ‘Rails in the Road’, a history of 
Tramways in Great Britain and Ireland, also contains a short section on the project. 
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He cites growing opposition and the economic downturn as being the reasons for the 
schemes failure.48 There have also been occasional retrospectives by the local 
newspaper, the Bristol Post.49 Yet, no work has looked at the reasons why the scheme 
was proposed in the first place or at the project in any depth. No work at all has 
examined events prior to the announcement of ATA in 1986. No work has linked the 
Avon Metro proposals to a wider conceptual framework of neoliberalism, its 
contribution to the changing nature of local governance or attitudes towards the 
automobile in the urban centre which this work does. 
 
Contribution to knowledge 
This thesis argues that Advanced Transport for Avon represented the neoliberal 
city’s purest policy expression and not the enterprise zone as argued by Wetherall.50 
Advanced Transport for Avon represented an alternative model for the implementation 
of urban neoliberalism which, if it had succeeded, would have provided a market based 
approach to urban regeneration and minimalised the role of the state to allowing 
private finance to lead regeneration and transport infrastructure within the city.  Whilst 
other studies have explored the emergence of the neoliberal agenda and its impact on 
urban theory, these have focused on central government policies of enterprise zones 
and urban development corporations.51  
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This work seeks to expand the literature by providing an analysis of another 
contemporary neoliberal concept to these, that of Advanced Transport for Avon and 
regeneration through the provision of tramway infrastructure. ATA is important as it 
intended to replace the role of the local authorities in transport governance without any 
active involvement from central government like these other concepts did. This work 
therefore provides a different perspective on the unfolding of urban neoliberalism at 
this time. By analysis what happened with ATA, a new appreciation can be gained of 
the extent of neoliberalism and its limitations during this period. This is the overarching 
contribution of this work.  
Using Brenner and Theodore’s view of the evolutionary and path dependant 
nature of neoliberalism, it can be ascertained that the reasons for ATA’s emergence 
was due to the problems in local government structure, lack of funding or the 
developing neoliberal economic agenda.52 The Avon Metro project was a somewhat 
unique expression of Turner’s four generic principles of neoliberalism, with private 
finance and the market intending to completely fund the system, a first for a modern 
public transport system, a strong minimal state to provide the legislative consent for 
the construction of the system through private acts of parliament, and by aiming to 
obtain the track bed from public bodies such as the City Council. As such, it deserves 
analysis as it represented a different potential framework for urban neoliberalism than 
the UDCs whilst this agenda was still evolving, aiming to privatise parts of the railway 
network in Bristol a decade before the privatisation of the national rail network. This 
adds to the scholarship by investigating an attempt at instigating neoliberal concepts 
that went far more than any government backed schemes at the time. 
                                                             





The work also seeks to make other contributions to the literature about the 
changing design of the city and attitudes towards the motorcar and the bicycle as 
transportation modes due to the metro concept in Bristol and the implications this had 
on national and local attitudes to both. In this sense, the work also seeks to determine 
the long-term legacy of the metro on a city which was dominated by the car and how 
this project started to open conversations in the city about how to best solve urban 
transportation problems. 
 
Source discussion and methodology 
Several different source types have been used to construct this research. Local 
newspapers, the Evening Post and the Western Daily Press, proved invaluable in 
providing a day-by-day account of events as these contain opinion pieces, letters and 
other minor updates which are often not recorded in any official or unofficial 
documents. Richard Cottrell’s background working for both the Evening Post and HTV 
before entering politics, provided him with the ability to use the media to his advantage. 
This resulted in most developments appearing in the local media first to stimulate 
discussion on the subject making this a rich source of information. Council meeting 
minutes from both the City and County Councils and the dedicated sub-committees 
set-up in 1987 to discuss the metro also proved invaluable. These provide a rich 
source of information, including technical reports from engineers and 
recommendations from parliamentary agents to understand the positions both 
councils took on the metro. The minutes are less important, however, for the first 
chapter of this work between 1979 and 1986 as Avon County Council dismissed the 
metro concept out of hand when first envisioned so there are no sub-committees to 




committees after the announcement of ATA. Study pamphlets and journals have also 
been useful as most information about Cottrell’s 1979 proposals are contained within 
an Initial Study, produced by Whicheloe Macfarlane, and an article he wrote for the 
journal Modern Railways. Later work, such as leaflets on ATAs proposals and a leaflet 
outlining the GLT proposals by Badgerline, have also been useful. The last major 
source of information has been from an interview conducted with Jack Penrose, a 
consultant on the ATA project, who was also involved in the Manchester Metrolink. 
This provides a useful viewpoint from someone working closely with the company 
about how events unfolded. 
 
Outline of structure 
 This research is divided into three chapters. The first looks at how, in the context 
of the 1979 oil crisis and increasing congestion on the roads, Richard Cottrell 
announced plans for an underground railway line under the city to create a more 
effective transport system. These proposals were designed to open debate on 
transport policy in the Avon region with the hope that the County Council would adopt 
the project as transport policy. The chapter examines the reasons why the council 
refused to adopt the project and how the metro proposals suggested ways to fix the 
broken structure of transport governance in the region. This chapter also examines 
how the Avon Metro project started to change perceptions of how congestion could be 
tackled in the urban centre.  
The second chapter examines how, in the context of the Thatcher governments 
neoliberal reforms, a company called Advanced Transport for Avon (ATA) pledged to 




attempted to recraft transport governance in the region by not relying on the structures 
of local government to adopt and construct the metro. Instead, private bills would be 
pursued in Parliament, eliminating the role the local authorities had in transport 
governance over the project. The chapter will explore how this recrafting played out 
between 1986 and 1989 and the challenges and opposition it faced. The chapter also 
explores how and why the project changed mode from an underground railway line to 
a street-running tram system and look at the problems this change caused the project.  
The third chapter explores the eventual acceptance of ATA’s recrafting of 
transport governance along neoliberal lines and why those who opposed the project 
lifted their concerns over its governance. It will examine new reasons for opposition to 
the metro, particularly in areas where different forms of mobility came into conflict 
along the proposed use of the Bristol to Bath Railway Path. The chapter identifies why, 
despite the acceptance of its methods by the tiers of government in the region, the 
project collapsed and whether this was due to the economic downturn, the inability of 
central government to support the project or due to other companies offering similar 












Attempting to work within the structure of transport 
governance: The Avon Metro, 1979 – 1986. 
 
Richard Cottrell began calls for an ‘Avon Metro’ in regional newspapers the Evening 
Post and the Western Daily Press from July 1979, shortly following his election as 
South West of England Member of the European Parliament (MEP). Working with 
architectural consultancy firm, Whicheloe Macfarlane, he published an Initial Study for 
an Avon Metro in the November. In this he argued that a metro would solve Bristol’s 
chronic traffic problems, conserve oil and help regenerate the city.53 The study 
identified that both defunct and active railway lines around the city could be tied 
together with a short piece of new underground railway, connecting Clifton Down 
Station and Laurence Hill, shown in figure 1. By building simple new underground 
stations along this route a fast and efficient metro system could be created than ran 
from the suburbs directly into the heart of the city, as shown in figure 2. Providing car 
parking at the stations as well as a realigned bus network to bring passengers to their 
nearest station people would be encouraged not to drive into the city. A through 
ticketing system would also make modal transfer easier.54 The study urged Avon 
County Council, which held statutory responsibility for public transport in the city, to 
fund a feasibility study to look at the proposals further.55  
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Figure. 2.  Artist’s impression of an Avon Metro underground station.57 
 
 
                                                             




Despite seeing merits in the proposals, the County Council declined to adopt the 
project as policy. It argued that the cost of a feasibility study could not be justified 
without any idea of where the estimated £300million required to construct the system 
would come from.58 Undeterred, Cottrell continued to promote his idea of a metro 
between 1979 and 1986 highlighting how it could be achieved at a lower cost.59 By 
1986, frustrated by the continued refusal of the council to adopt the project, Cottrell 
started to explore how the metro could be built by private finance alone at no cost to 
ratepayers and without the need for the council to adopt the idea.60 
This chapter explores how the Avon Metro was first presented as a solution to the 
problem of the automobile in the urban centre, beginning a debate on transport within 
the city of Bristol. It also examines the structural problems in the non-metropolitan 
County of Avon that prevented the Council from adopting the metro concept. It also 
explores how the Initial Study suggested ways that the County Council could raise the 
required funding for a metro within these constraints and how the metro eventually 
came to be influenced by the emergence of neoliberal ideas by 1986. This would 
eventually result in a private company being formed to build the metro outside of the 
County Council’s control.  
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The Avon Metro and the shifting attitude towards mobility and the 
automobile 1979 - 1986 
The first ‘modern’ metro systems in the UK, the Tyne and Wear Metro (1980), 
Merseyrail, (1977) and the Argyll Line in Glasgow (1979), were not designed to deal 
with the problem of road-based congestion in urban centres but to increase mobility 
for those without a car. Howard and Layfield’s study of the Tyne and Wear Metro 
argues that that system’s key aim was to allow greater employment opportunities for 
those without a car by providing greater transport to developing city districts following 
deindustrialisation. Docherty argues a similar case in both Merseyside and Glasgow 
where metros were constructed in areas where car ownership was historically low.61 
This was due to the Transport Act (1968) consolidating a need to maintain transport 
planning for the ‘car-less’ in society.62 Later metro schemes, by contrast, in 
Manchester, Sheffield and the Midlands, all held as a primary aim cutting urban traffic 
congestion in addition to improving mobility.63 This section argues that the Avon Metro 
proposals of 1979 was instrumental in pioneering this change as it was the first metro 
system proposed that had cutting congestion and reducing reliance on the automobile 
as its core aim.  
 The Avon Metro proposals took the Tyne and Wear metro as its basic blueprint, 
with Cottrell writing that ‘Newcastle is the example we should copy’.64 There was, 
however, one major difference between the two cities. Car ownership levels in Tyne 
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and Wear were low compared to the higher than average rates in Avon.65 Bristol had 
long suffered from traffic problems resulting in a long line of failed projects in the region 
to improve traffic flow. One proposal - to construct ‘pavements in the sky’ to segregate 
traffic and pedestrian in the city centre, had only been partially implemented. Whilst 
another - the construction of an inner ring-road had been cancelled shortly after half 
of the inner-city suburb of Totterdown had been flattened to make way for a new 
junction leaving distaste and controversy in the city over such projects.66 On outlining 
his metro proposals, Cottrell argued the city was facing ‘impending cardiac failure due 
to the clogging of its transport arteries’ and that building more roads was not the 
solution.67 He also argued that feeder routes into the city were unsuitable for the 
construction of bus lanes and this left rail improvement as the only option.68  
Providing further impetus was the ongoing global oil crisis of 1979. Cottrell 
argued that ‘the days of cheap energy are over and only systems such as his proposal 
could provide fast, efficient and economic urban transport’.69 The Avon Metro was the 
first system proposed following the oil crisis which had led people to question the 
stability of the car system for the first time.70 Therefore, the Avon Metro proposals were 
the first to react to this uncertain future. Cottrell’s study argued that the city’s 
dependence on the automobile was created by a lack of a viable alternative which had 
been caused by the closure of many of Bristol’s suburban railway lines.71 The resultant 
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high levels of car ownership and urban congestion then led to a huge waste of fuel 
from cars idling - ‘consider how much vital oil is turned into useless vapour on the 
Centre between four and six p.m.’ Cottrell argued.72 The metro’s justification, 
therefore, was specifically about conserving fuel and preventing the construction of 
further roads but not about improving air quality, despite an increasing understanding 
of the link between the automobile and air quality at the time.73 The Avon Metro, 
therefore, sought to redesign the urban environment away from dependence on the 
automobile.74 It would achieve this by better utilisation of existing and closed rail routes 
around the city and for the first time within modern British metro systems, placing 
cutting congestion as one of its core principles. 
Fundamental features of the Avon Metro were inspired from home and abroad 
as to how to improve the urban environment. The Stadtbahn (S-Bahn) systems of 
Germany provided strong inspiration and were particular focuses for Cottrell.75 This 
had the benefit of highlighting his role as an MEP to prove his worth to an electorate 
who had just voted in European elections for the first time.76 German transport policies 
had been formed from a Federal Report published in 1964, around the time of the 
Beeching Report and Traffic in Towns in Britain, which led to very different approaches 
to transport policies between the two countries. Whilst British policy discourse had 
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recommended substantial investment in roads, in Germany it was concluded that Light 
Rapid Transit (LRT) should form the basis of dealing with the problem of the car in 
cities.77 Cottrell argued that European neighbours had invested in excellent urban 
transportation systems which protected the urban environment and prevented 
congestion and these had become an essential part of the civic furniture.78 The S-
Bahn system in Munich shared many of the features of the proposed Avon Metro as 
both aimed to preserve the city-centre urban environment and cut congestion with a 
central underground tunnel to deal with a paucity of river crossings in the city.79  
Influences also came from the Tyne and Wear Metro. These included the 
integration of local bus services and large parking facilities at outlying stations to 
encourage modal transfer.80 These became an important part of the Avon Metro’s aim 
to encourage all sections of society to use the metro. Car owners could park their car 
at the stations whilst the bus services would not follow constricted routes into the city. 
These would instead travel along less busy routes to the nearest metro station. 
Publicity photos of the Tyne and Wear Metro were also modified for the initial study 
highlighting this direct inspiration. The Avon Metro concept therefore took inspiration 
from developments at home, but also from Germany in producing the concept of what 
a metro system in the region could achieve. 
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Despite aiming to provide a comprehensive alternative to the car, the Avon 
Metro concept was unable to challenge the car system during this period. Between 
1979 and 1986, local investment in rail remained low. Avon County Council only 
allocated £40,000 to renovate the main commuter rail route into the city, the Severn 
Beach Line, yet also proceeded with the construction of the Avon Ring Road at a cost 
of £43 million.81 Regional rail development focused instead on how to reduce costs 
rather than expand services as displayed by trails for the British Leyland Railbus, a 
one carriage bus on rails, which had much lower running costs than a standard train.82 
Rail services in the region continued to be cut despite having the potential to form a 
useful commuter service if expanded.83 Overspill developments on the city’s periphery, 
such as the town of Yate - expanded in the 1960s only to have its station closed, also 
continued to  have no connection to the local railway network.84 One disused railway 
line with the potential to serve a corridor to the north east of the city, was converted 
into a segregated cycle and pedestrian path by a local group, Cyclebag. This 
highlighted a lack of desire to protect these routes for future rail development. Despite 
the aim of the initial study to act as a hinge for transport policy debate in the region, 
very little had been achieved in promoting a railway network as a viable solution to 
Bristol’s urban congestion by 1986.85  
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The Avon Metro, therefore, redefined the aims of metro systems in the UK. 
Inspiration was taken from the Tyne and Wear Metro and from S-Bahn systems 
merging into a concept that was designed around improving the urban environment by 
removing the need to drive into the urban centre and to provide a comprehensive 
alternative to the car in the context of an expected scarcity of future oil supplies. This 
principal was adopted by future metro systems in the UK such as ones in Manchester, 
Sheffield and the Midlands away from providing purely an egalitarian role, improving 
mobility for those without a car and towards tackling congestion.86 The Avon Metro 
aimed to appeal across society to both the car owner and those without the car by 
providing expanded bus services to its stations as well as car parks to ease modal 
exchange. This was to be an important component of the proposals due to the high-
levels of car ownership in the region and the lack of effective bus routes into the city. 
Despite these proposals not being realised, these did go on to change the approach 
that other cities would take with the construction of metro systems by making these 
more congestion-focused. This represented a key change in the thinking behind the 
objectives of modern urban transportation systems in the UK. The role of the Avon 
Metro in this change has not been identified previously. 
 
The Avon Metro and governance of the city, 1979 - 1986 
 Analyses of urban rail transport infrastructure projects in the United Kingdom 
during this period have focused on either the development of metro systems within the 
metropolitan counties, or on projects in London which had its own unique structure for 
                                                             




transport development.87 There has not been a comparative study on developments 
in non-metropolitan counties, which had a different structure of governance. This 
section explores structural problems in the county of Avon which resulted in the County 
Council being unable to support transport infrastructure projects. This left the city of 
Bristol at a disadvantage compared to other cities in the UK. The Avon Metro was 
originally conceived to work within the existing structures of governance in the region 
and find solutions to its flaws, yet, by 1986 this would change to attempting to 
implement a metro by completely evading the existing structure of governance. This 
section explores why this occurred.  
 Both the Transport Act (1968) and Local Government Act (1972) had given 
English city regions larger than Bristol ‘the right sort of structure for effective land-use 
transport planning integration’.88 This included the setting up of Passenger Transport 
Authorities (PTAs) consisting of elected representatives to direct general transport 
policy plans in these areas. Additionally, Passenger Transport Executives (PTEs), 
made up of professionals, would manage the day-to day implementation of these 
plans.89 The metropolitan counties, therefore, were able to plan effective, integrated 
transport policies, directing both the local bus company (until deregulation in 1986) 
and British Rail in the provision of public transportation. Metropolitan County Councils 
were also able to apply for government grants for the construction of new infrastructure 
and could subsidise important local services.90 Bristol, however, became the largest 
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city in England not to receive metropolitan county status and was subsumed into the 
non-metropolitan county of Avon instead. Avon did not have the ability to co-ordinate 
transport, apply for grants or subsidise services and this placed Bristol at a significant 
disadvantage.91 This meant, the county of Avon lacked the structures of governance, 
strategic vision and funding to provide effective transport policies in the region. As a 
result, the County Council’s transport budget did not meet its needs, remaining 
chronically underfunded and reported at only £7million for 1981.92 
 Further problems were caused by the creation of Avon. Bristol City Council lost 
many powers it had held since 1373 and other areas of the county.93  As a result, 
Bristol City Council’s leader campaigned in 1983 to retrieve powers lost to Avon eleven 
years prior.94 In addition, other areas of the county which had historically belonged to 
Gloucestershire and Somerset continued an ongoing campaign to be allowed to return 
to their historic counties.95 Governmental responsibilities in the county also became 
fractured, making it unclear exactly what tier of government was responsible for what 
policy resulting in discord over projects where local authority power overlapped. This 
resulted in arguments over who should deliver proposals to improve the road layout in 
the city.96 The county’s structure, with a strong urban and rural divide also resulted in 
stark political divides, shown in figure 3, that caused frequent shifts in power and a 
lack of consistency, direction and vision in policies.97 These problems in governance 
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led to one resident dubbing Bristol ‘the city of white elephants’ in a letter to the Evening 
Post due to the amount of proposals that collapsed amid political disagreement.98 
Even the leader of the County Council questioned the point of the county’s existence.99 
Avon’s creation, therefore, was problematic, resulting in a lack of an effective structure 
and an inability to access finance to enable it to support and implement effective 
transport policies. 
Figure. 3. Avon County wards in 1981 showing the strong Labour control over the environs of 
the city of Bristol and largely Conservative control over the surrounding environs of Avon.100   
Key: Blue – Conservative Wards, Red – Labour Wards, Yellow – Liberal Party Wards 
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The Initial Study for an Avon Metro identified these problems of transport 
governance in the County but also acknowledged that the creation of a PTE would 
require an Act of Parliament.101 By comparison, German equivalents to PTEs, the 
Verkehrsverbunds, could be formed voluntarily by municipalities highlighting the 
difference in approach elsewhere.102 The study instead suggested the setting up a 
corporate board consisting of British Rail, the local Bus company and Avon County 
Council to run the metro. This represented the closest form of integration of transport 
modes possible without a PTE and would require Avon County Council to finance 
operations of the metro.103 Examining options for construction costs, the study 
dismissed the possibility of using private finance, foreseeing ‘difficulties’ in its 
application.104 Instead it highlighted that in Tyne and Wear, its PTE was able to apply 
for a 70% infrastructure grant to construct its metro system which Avon County Council 
just could not do.105 The study suggested either applying for such a grant anyway, or 
raising finance from other sources, such as a loan from the European Bank or seeking 
the implementation of a German model of local taxation on petrol to fund 
construction.106 In Germany these had covered the cost of around 60% of transport 
infrastructure in municipalities with the remainder being provided by the state, showing 
their effectiveness. This, however, would require legislative change to be implemented 
in the United Kingdom to allow this.107 The study, therefore, was conceptualising ways 
to work within, and modify, the existing structures of governance and funding in Avon 
to construct the metro, attempting to integrate public transport providers and the local 
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authority as closely as possible without a PTE. At this stage it was not exploring the 
use of private finance to construct the system, proposing instead either local 
government funding, a central government grant or convincing the government to 
experiment with different models of taxation like in Germany.  
On publication, the County Council regarded the Initial Study as an attempt by 
outsiders to direct its policy and reminded Cottrell that it held ‘sole responsibility for 
the co-ordination of public transport in the county’.108 It refused to fund the feasibility 
study costs of between £125,000 - £750,000 arguing that there was no inclination of 
where the costs for the system would come from.109 Instead of the initial study acting 
as a ‘hinge for discussion’ as intended, the proposals were dismissed. The poor 
structure of governance in the region had created a situation where the council needed 
to assert itself yet was unwilling to push for a greater transport settlement due to the 
fractious politics in the region. The differing priorities of different areas of the county 
were displayed by Yate Town Council’s supportive response to the Initial Study’s 
proposals, visiting Glasgow’s PTE and setting aside £2,000 towards the cost of the 
feasibility study.110 Cottrell also found support from British Rail, which had helped to 
develop the initial plans, and a variety of transport pressure groups including Transport 
2000, the Severn Beach Passenger Association and the Railway Development 
Society. These groups co-ordinated their voice into a pressure group called ‘The Metro 
Partnership’ to promote the idea of the metro.111  
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With wide-ranging support from different organisations, Cottrell became a 
threat to the County Council’s authority. When Cottrell attended the launch of County 
Council funded improvements to the Severn Beach line in 1981 to argue the case for 
the metro, the Labour group on the Council boycotted the event. Cottrell believed that 
this was for political reasons, remarking: ‘there is an element of spitefulness about it. 
It doesn’t matter if I am a socialist or a Conservative, what we are talking about here 
is the betterment of the public transportation system in Avon’.112 In 1983 the Labour 
leader of the Council also criticised Cottrell’s modus operandi writing in the Evening 
Post that Cottrell was ‘a highly paid ex-journalist who spends most of his time writing 
newspaper columns…our representative in Europe is doing nothing’.113 Party political 
allegiances in the region, caused partly by poor structure, had caused the metro 
concept to become an arena to act out political battles. 
In conclusion, local government reforms left the county of Avon with a poor 
framework for local governance that did not allow effective transport policies for a large 
urban area such as Bristol. Census data for 1981 places the population of Avon close 
to the population of the Tyne and Wear region, yet they received completely different 
structures.114 The resultant balkanisation of governance in the region created deep 
divisions and contributed to increased allegiance to party political lines and an inability 
to co-operate as a result. Bristol was therefore left at a significant disadvantage 
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compared to other cities as its governmental settlement did not have access to the 
level of funding required to construct an ambitious public transportation system. 
Cottrell’s Avon Metro was envisioned as a way of exploring how to work around these 
problems and to act as a ‘hinge for debate’ on transport policy.115 Yet the suggestions 
raised by the initial study required either changes to taxation policy or loans from the 
European Bank on an unprecedented scale and were dismissed by the County Council 
who came to see the proposals as a threat.116 Instead of solving the problems with the 
structure, the metro just became another victim of the problems created by this 
structure. The lesson learnt by Cottrell was that if he wanted to see a metro built in the 
city of Bristol, he could not rely on the County Council to implement it. 
 
The changing nature of the city and the emergence of the neoliberal 
agenda, 1979 - 1986 
This section examines how the changing nature of the city during the 1980s 
eventually led Cottrell, unable to convince the County Council to adopt his metro, to 
become influenced by neoliberal ideas. This would change the nature of the project 
from trying to work within the ineffective structure of governance in the region to 
changing the system of governance completely by 1986.   
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Poor transport infrastructure in urban areas can negatively affect a city’s 
competitive edge and obstruct urban regeneration.117 On the launch of the Initial 
Study, Cottrell identified that a metro system would allow the city to compete more 
effectively with European cities and that Tyne and Wear had seen economic benefits 
from export orders for components developed for its metro.118 Tyne and Wear, he 
argued, considered its metro the best investment the city had made, contributing to its 
economic regeneration and that a metro in Avon could achieve similar results.119 In 
this respect this reflects Saumarez Smith’s assertion that the late 1970s were a ‘brief 
moment’ when failures in post-war planning could be appraised and tackled because 
funding was available for both redevelopment and infrastructure to deal with problems 
caused by deindustrialisation and suburbanisation.120 This funding for transport was 
manifest in the grants available for the PTEs and Cottrell identified that Bristol could 
also benefit from this arguing, ‘from 1981, Newcastle’s need for funding [for the 
construction of its Metro] will begin to decline. That is the time for Avon to come forward 
with a sound, well-prepared case to go Metro’.121 Thus expanding on how applying for 
a government grant despite the County having no right to do so could work. 
  During the 1970s, the economic base of cities was changing from an industrial 
base and towards the service sector. This was seen in  Bristol with an additional 1.7 
million square feet of office space having just been authorised at the time of the metro’s 
conception whilst industrial closures such as the closure of St Anne’s Boardmills 
factory and the Bristol Bus works.122 At the time the main commuter line, the Severn 
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Beach Branch Line, carried only 1,200 passengers a day to Temple Meads Station; 
sited an inconvenient distance away from the city centre. A new route directly through 
the city would make rail much more attractive to the commuter travelling from the 
suburbs.123 The Avon Metro aimed to support this emerging business-orientated city, 
as seen in illustrations in the initial study, shown in figure 4., showing business men in 
suits riding ‘metrocars’ and buses which carried clean, crisp, modern Avon Metro 
branding. The metrocars were to emerge from tunnels into well-lit, spacious and clean 
stations in the very heart of the business district of the city, as seen in figure 5., 
reflecting the key role the metro would play in the transformation from industrial to 
post-industrial cityscape.  
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Figure. 5. Avon Metro underground station and metrocar and bus liveries.125 
 
 
Outlining the proposals, Cottrell explained that the metro took as its raw material: 
 the existing basic railway network, the tattered remnants of 
the largely-vanished Bristol suburban system: to this we added the 
trackless nature trails which make up the old Midland network and 
one or two emasculated Great Western Branches which nudge 
towards the suburbs and the country.126   
 
The metro would, therefore, achieve a transformation of the city by re-appropriating 
the decaying industrial railway infrastructure that once transported goods to and 
around the city’s harbour, now in terminal decline, to help provide the infrastructure for 
its business future. The proposed names for the lines, seen in figure 6., also reflected 
the change from industrial to post-industrial, linking the city’s past history of trade and 
engineering, with lines such as ‘Brunel’ and ‘Imperial’, to present, high-tech, industries 
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and the developing metropolitan centre, with lines such as ‘Concorde’ and 
‘Metropolitan’. The metro would be the catalyst for economic change in the city. It 
would help urban regeneration by rejuvenating Bristol’s suburban railway network, re-
purposing it into a valuable resource for commuters, now that the need to move freight 
to the harbour by rail had gone. It would reflect the glories of Bristol’s past and present 
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The changing economic foundation of the city, however, eventually influenced 
how the metro could be implemented. Following frustration at the County Council’s 
refusals to fund the feasibility study, Cottrell told a conference in April 1982 that central 
government should instead pay for the construction of projects like the Avon Metro 
due to the inability of local government to fund these itself.128 This was shortly after 
the construction of the Docklands Light Railway in London which had been paid for via 
a direct grant of £77million, contributed equally by the Ministry of Transport and 
Ministry of the Environment, to help regeneration of this area.129 The London 
Docklands also represented the first stages of increased centralisation by the national 
government with the setting up of the London Docklands Development Company to 
provide the conditions for private investment and this was echoed in Cottrell’s calls for 
greater central government involvement. Cottrell repeated calls for central government 
support in setting up metros at a fringe meeting at the Conservative Party conference 
in October 1982, but also advocated that private companies should be handed rural 
rail services to run with the aid of grants from local authorities.130 Slowly, Cottrell was 
becoming influenced by neoliberal ideas of the ability of private ownership and the 
market to develop the metro. By 1986, this position had developed into the belief that 
the entire project could be financed by private finance at no cost to the taxpayer with 
construction implemented in stages to reduce the cost burden.131 This change had 
occurred due to the County Council’s inability to take-on the project and by national 
developments including the first tranche of privatisations by the government. This 
would be a departure from contemporary urban neoliberal policies as it envisioned 
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even less of a role for government in urban redevelopment than it had in setting up 
the UDCs to encourage private development as this need would be cut out. 
This was supported by a changing landscape in local government. The Local 
Government Act (1985) abolished the six metropolitan counties along with the PTAs 
whilst the powers of the PTEs were reduced by the Transport Act (1985) which 
removed bus services from its control.132 The model for transport governance that 
Bristol had aspired to in 1979 had now changed. The opportunity now existed to reform 
transport governance into a model that reflected both the current Thatcher 
government’s ideology of reducing the control of local government, who had blocked 
the metro, and promoting the involvement of private finance in urban regeneration, 
which could provide funding for the metro. Cottrell seized on this moment by 
announcing the formation of a new company in November 1986 called Advanced 
Transport for Avon (ATA) which would construct the metro privately without the 
involvement of the County Council.  
To conclude, the Avon Metro was originally conceived to spur regeneration of 
the city by re-utilising decaying industrial infrastructure but was frustrated by the lack 
of finance available to the County Council to take up the project. Originally developed 
to find solutions to this ineffective structure in 1979, the conceptual thinking behind the 
project evolved by the mid-1980s through a growing engagement with emerging 
neoliberal ideologies to break free of this constrictive structure. In doing so, the metro 
would try to reform transport governance by presenting a new model of governance 
due to the previous idealised model of PTEs and metropolitan counties having been 
broken down. The details of this new model would take time to evolve and is expanded 
                                                             





on in chapter two, but the concept was fixed of using the private sector to solve the 
problems of poorly-funded governmental structures in the region representing a 





















Conclusions from Chapter One 
This chapter has explored the conceptual origins of the Avon Metro and its 
development between 1979 and 1986. Several key developments are identified to add 
to the historical scholarship. 
The Avon Metro concept was a reaction to specific conditions: an ongoing oil 
crisis, high car ownership in the Avon area, the progress of other cities of a similar 
economic make-up and comparisons to other systems in Europe. Whilst it did not 
achieve much in this period it conceptually tied together these ideas and expanded on 
them to produce a much more radical concept that sought to reduce the dependency 
on the car in the urban centre. This had an important impact on the nature of metro 
systems in the UK as after this they also sought to reduce the dependency on the car 
as one of their key goals.  
An additional condition for the conception of the Avon Metro was the poor 
structure of government in the Avon region which had led to a lack of aspiration in 
transport projects and had been stifled by a lack of funding. The Avon Metro was 
envisioned to help the Council find solutions within this structure to improve the 
situation, but these solutions fell on death ears due to the fears of the council of others 
infringing on its responsibilities citing a lack of clear funding for the proposals. Early 
proposals for funding specifically saw problems with private finance and instead 
looked at how to achieve funding by asking the council to apply to sources such as 
the European Bank or to ask the central government for a grant. At this stage the Avon 
Metro was not a neoliberal project as it aimed to work within the structures and sought 





In reaction to the poor response from the county council to the proposals, 
Cottrell started to embrace the growing neoliberal agenda by re-appraising the role 
that private finance could play in the provision of a metro for the city. This eventually 
came to envision the metro providing the basis for regeneration in the city but solely 
using private finance and eliminating the role of local government completely and 
involving no role for central government. This was a step further than the governments 
ideas for providing the basis for regeneration by setting up UDCs as the government 
would not be setting up the company as it would be a completely private affair. This 
highlights the path dependent nature in the unfolding of neoliberal ideas as argued by 
Brenner and Theodore. Yet at this stage the concept of how the money would be 
















The rise: Advanced Transport for Avon and the recrafting of 
transport governance, November 1986 – May 1989 
By 1986, reforms by the Thatcher government were starting to change the political 
and economic landscape of the United Kingdom. Neoliberal policies of privatisations, 
a rolling back of the state and the creation of Urban Development Corporations to 
encourage private investment in urban regeneration aimed to make the state the 
enabler rather than provider of services.133 In addition, reforms to local government 
had dismantled the structure of transport governance through reducing the power of 
local authorities and transport executives and deregulating bus services. This process 
caused particular consternation in local District Labour Parties (DLPs) as many of 
these reforms sought to undermine control of Labour-led councils nationally.134 
Within this context, Cottrell announced the foundation of a company called 
Advanced Transport for Avon (ATA) in November 1986. This would construct the 
metro and not rely on the County Council to adopt the idea. He would be Chairman 
and Brian Tucker, who had previously worked on the 1979 plans, was named 
Managing Director.135 ATA would work outside the constrictive structures of local 
governance and finance which had stopped progress on the construction of the metro 
up to this point. In doing so, ATA would act as a pioneering project to establish the 
extent to which private finance could form a new model for the provision of public 
transport infrastructure. The project would face several obstacles. The District Labour 
Party and the Bennite MP for Labour South, Dawn Primarolo, were both hostile to the 
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idea of a private company owning a public transportation system and this hostility 
spread to the Labour-led City Council. The City Council feared that the compulsory 
purchase powers ATA would seek in its private bills would further erode its power and 
promote unsuitable developments. The metro, therefore, became drawn into a new 
battleground this time between the those hoping to preserve the power of local 
authorities and those hoping to develop emerging neoliberal ideas about the role of 
the state. Yet, despite strong opposition, ATA was successful in 1989 in achieving 
royal assent for its first parliamentary bill authorising the construction of the initial 
section of the system.136 This suggested that the new model that ATA had presented 
could work and the concept was, to this point, succeeding. 
This chapter explores how ATA attempted to recraft transport governance by 
examining the rationale behind the concept and the development of its financial model. 
The chapter will then explore how this recrafting of transport governance played out 
between 1986 and 1989 to identify how the company was able to obtain royal assent 
for its first Parliamentary Act despite stiff opposition to the entire concept. The chapter 
examines how successfully ATA implemented the neoliberal agenda the government 
promoted of seeing private companies take on responsibilities for areas in which the 
state had previously provided. Finally, the chapter examines how attitudes to the car 
and public transportation were beginning to change in the city due to the debate 




                                                             




The recrafting of Transport governance, 1986 - 1987  
Up to 1986 progress on an Avon Metro had stalled due to Avon County Council 
refusing to adopt the concept due to an ineffective framework of financing to support 
infrastructure development. ATA positioned itself as an innovative solution to the lack 
of leadership and finance in the county to enable the metro’s construction. ATA 
attempted to recraft transport governance, using private finance, instead of local 
authority funding or central government grant, to construct the metro. Other metro 
projects in the United Kingdom at this time, by comparison, operated under a Design, 
Build, Operate and Maintain (DBOM) contract between the local authority and the 
private sector. Here funding came jointly from the local authority and a central 
government grant as in the case of the Manchester Metrolink.137 ATA, however, 
intended to own and operate the system itself and not be under any form of local 
authority control. It’s funding would come from where the metro would help to 
regenerate parts of the city through a financial model known as ‘planning gain’. This 
was where developers would contribute funds based on the projected increased value 
of their land from the provision of the metro. As such, the metro represented a form of 
redevelopment among neoliberal principles of encouraging the free-market and 
reducing the role of the state that was similar to Urban Development Corporations in 
providing the foundation for redevelopment yet would not receive any funding from 
governmental sources at all. 
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Richard Cottrell first raised the possibility of private finance funding the Avon 
Metro in May 1986.138 Shortly after, a feasibility study into the plans, which Avon 
County Council had long refused to fund, was announced to be undertaken in the 
September.139 This was to be paid for by Hawker-Siddely Group plc., which operated 
a railway vehicle manufacturing subsidiary.140 By November, the formation of 
Advanced Transport for Avon (ATA), a private company, was announced to build and 
operate the metro.141 The initial plans, published in November 1986, were almost 
identical to the 1979 proposals of a new central underground tunnel carrying suburban 
rail services.142 Yet through 1987, these plans underwent significant change. Banking 
and construction groups joined the project, a £1 million business study was 
undertaken, and a target set of beginning operations within four years.143 The 
proposals were officially relaunched in an interview with Cottrell in the Evening Post 
on 28th October 1987 where he announced that ATA were ‘bringing back the tram’ and 
sought to construct a street-running tramway system instead of an underground 
railway.144 To obtain powers to construct the system, ATA were to submit three private 
parliamentary bills, submitted in yearly intervals. The routes covered in these are 
shown in figure 7. The route in the first bill (in yellow), sought to take-over the existing, 
disused, Portishead Line, running from the commuter town of Portishead and along 
the Avon Gorge. The bill also sought powers to obtain sections of the Bristol Harbour 
Railway, which connected to this line at Ashton Gate, to run to Wapping Wharf just 
                                                             
138 ‘Trams ‘would save shops’’, Evening Post, 23rd May 1986, p. 75. 
139 Martin Powell, ‘£100m Metro Link Hopes’, Evening Post, 16th July 1986, p. 3. 
140 ‘City in line for new metro system’, Evening Post, 10th September 1986, p. 10. 
141 Michael Lord, ‘Metro makes tracks for Avon rail future’, Evening Post, 20th November 1986, p. 1-2. 
142 Michael Lord, ‘Metro makes tracks for Avon rail future’, Evening Post, 20th November 1986, p. 1. 
143 Michael Lord, ‘Hopes rise for Metro’, Evening Post, 18th February 1987, p. 10.; Nigel Heath, ‘Ideal for homes?’ 
Evening Post, 31st March 1987, p. 1.; Michael Lord, ‘Giants join in bid for Avon Metro’, Evening Post, 3rd April 
1987, p. 1.; Nigel Heath, ‘New Jobs, new homes’, Evening Post, 9th June 1987, p. 1.; Norman Cossland, ‘Avon 
Metro: £1m study is lined up’, Evening Post, 12th May 1987, p. 4.; Michael Lord, ‘Metro arrives in ‘Four years’’, 
Evening Post, 17th July 1987, p. 2.   




short of the city centre. The second bill’s route, (in red) would be pursued the following 
year and would extend the line from Wapping Wharf through the city centre. The third 
bill’s route (in orange), would complete this cross-city route up to Yate. Routes could 
later be added, either adopting existing railway lines or consisting of new construction, 
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 Railway construction had historically been authorised through the passage of 
Private Acts of Parliament but following the grouping of the big-four railway companies 
in the 1920s and then post-war nationalisation, there was little requirement for such 
bills to be passed.147 Private Acts gave promoters powers to compulsory purchase 
land, where required, and avoided the need for formal planning permission. This 
meant that both local authority involvement and the need for a public inquiry could be 
evaded.148 It was possible to petition against these bills in Parliament, but only those  
whom were specifically affected by the bill could do so.149 This meant that the only 
potential objectors to ATA’s plans were those who owned the land which ATA sought 
to run its tramway over and they could only object over how it affected the land directly. 
The land owner, for a large part of the route, was the City Council. This method aimed 
to make the process of gaining permission much simpler and ATA would submit bills 
in different stages as and when it was ready. Yet, for the City Council, this meant it 
could not block the system for being the wrong type of development for the city, only 
oppose the system over the effect on the land directly involved. Private bills had to be 
deposited in Parliament by the end of November to be considered in that parliamentary 
session and with ATA only announcing the change to trams in October 1987, this left 
a very short amount of time for the local authorities to respond to ATA’s proposals 
providing the company with some of its initial problems.150  
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The metro was soon heralded as a ‘free-gift’ to the city of Bristol, as ATA 
intended to pay for its construction using private finance only and without reliance on 
rates or taxes.151 ATA would use a method called ‘planning gain’ to raise finance to 
pay for construction of the system where developers would contribute towards the cost 
based on the increase in land values that would result from the metro’s construction.152 
This would also spark urban regeneration by making areas more attractive to 
developers. The Times approved of this model, noting that the route outlined in the 
first stage ‘passes sites fat with development potential’ in its assessment of the 
scheme.153 Planning gain was previously used on a small scale by the London 
Docklands Development Company in London, but had not yet been used to finance 
the construction of a railway or on this scale before.154 ATA would therefore be using 
a new and innovative method of financing in its recrafting of transport governance to 
raise money by adding value to future developments for the first time in a non-London 
context. 
Initial funding for ATA came from Hawker-Siddely who funding the feasibility 
study based on potential future orders for rolling stock.155 Trafalgar House, a large 
construction group joined the project in 1987. It had recently sought permission to build 
homes on the disused Portishead Power Station site and with the first section of the 
route running from here this is where the funds from ‘planning gain’ would come 
from.156 ATA’s backers therefore represented private companies working together in 
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a mutual interest, to provide transport infrastructure and to benefit their future business 
showing how the market would self-regulate without the need for governmental 
interference as a different model of neoliberal ideas to what was occurring in 
Enterprise Zones and Urban Development Corporations to encourage regeneration. 
 Overall costs were reduced by switching mode from underground railway to 
street-running trams. This would not entail the construction of an expensive 
underground tunnel beneath the city and followed similar developments in both 
Manchester and London. In Manchester, plans to build an underground railway 
connecting its two main stations, Piccadilly and Victoria, were abandoned based on 
cost with the city turning towards trams as a cheaper alternative.157  In London, the 
cost of extending the London Underground to the London Docklands development 
area was estimated at £325million before the decision was made to build a surface 
light rail system, the Docklands Light Railway for £77million instead.158 Submitting bills 
in stages also reduced costs  as this avoided dealing with all the problems that would 
arise at once and allow greater freedom to perfect each section, which was also 
important considering the late change in mode for the proposed system. 
ATA also provided an alternative to the ineffective structure of governance in 
the region. The problems of governance were displayed again in August 1986 when 
the City and County Councils squabbled over competing plans to reduce traffic in the 
city centre and improve the urban environment. The City Council wanted to make large 
parts of the city centre traffic free, whilst the County Council feared these proposals 
would interfere with its own plans to link 75 sets of traffic lights to a computer-controlled 
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system in the city.159 ATA represented an alternative model of the market, not 
squabbling tiers of elected officials, solving the requirements of the city and carrying 
the risk involved. This was at a time when both tiers could not co-operate, nor able to 
suggest a comprehensive solution to the traffic issues beyond pedestrianisation of a 
few roads or linking lights. A comprehensive metro system was again presented as 
the solution. Only now it didn’t require either tier to embrace it or finance it, and ATA 
could just get on and start the process of obtaining permission from Parliament to build 
it.160  
To conclude, following government reforms to reduce the powers of local 
government, the conditions existed for a new model of transport governance in the 
United Kingdom which ATA attempted to fill. Reflecting the government’s neoliberal 
agenda and announced during a period of economic growth, ATA would construct the 
Avon Metro using only private finance and evading the ineffective governmental 
structures by using the market instead. Presented as a ‘free-gift’ to the city of Bristol, 
ATA would use the method of ‘planning gain’ for the first time outside London. This 
would solve the problem of where funding would come from. ATA sought the passage 
of private bills through Parliament, the first in a generation for a privately financed 
railway company, to authorise construction of the metro and gain powers of 
compulsory purchase to buy the track bed. This meant that any opposition to the 
project would come from issues relating to land and not from opposition to the concept. 
This model meant that the tiers of local government, which had shown an inability to 
work together or effectively solve the transport issues in the city, would not be required 
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to lead the project and instead a combination of companies working together and 
carrying the risk would do so instead. This would spark urban regeneration and 
investment in the city on a wider basis by the provision of useful transport 
infrastructure. A shift from underground railway to street-running trams and the 
decision to obtain parliamentary approval in stages would reduce the overall cost of 
the system. ATA presented a new form of transport governance, at a time when 
neoliberalism was challenging the economic and governmental structure of the 
country, that sought to radically alter the current process for implementing public 
transportation in the urban centre. The next section will examine the reactions to this 
recrafting of transport governance and how the attempt to implement this model 
unfolded between 1987 and 1989. 
 
How did the recrafting of transport governance play out, 1987 – 1989? 
Shortly after presenting its new model for transport governance, ATA deposited 
its first Avon Light Rail Transit Bill in Parliament in November 1987. Due to its radical 
nature, ATA faced many obstacles in the battle to get this bill passed. This section 
follows the progress of this bill and the reaction by both tiers of local government to 
this model, through to the bill achieving royal assent in May 1989. It then assesses 
how effective its model was in practice to ascertain how ATA fared in a changing 
landscape of local governance. 
When ATA submitted the first bill to Parliament on the 19th November 1987, 
both tiers of government in the region voiced concern. Despite the concept of a metro 
dating back to 1979 and the idea to construct it privately being announced in 




fund construction or the use of street-running trams was announced.161 The tight 
parliamentary deadline to submit the bill before the end of November left only twenty-
three days for both tiers of local government to assess the project’s impact. The City 
Council, which owned the track bed of the Bristol Harbour Railway, feared losing it if 
ATA obtained compulsory purchase powers. It also feared the loss of the Portishead 
Line which it hoped could connect Royal Portbury Dock, which it ran and operated, to 
the national rail network to transport freight.162 The County Council felt that the project 
was ‘premature’ and required assurances that ATA had sufficient financial resources 
to construct and operate the project.163 Both tiers formed sub-committees to discuss 
responses to the proposals and drew up petitions of objections to be presented in 
Parliament to protect their interests.164 Both tiers complained about a lack of 
information about the project. The City Council despatched a series of urgent 
questions to ATA demanding why there had been a lack of consultation with them. 
ATA responded it didn’t need to consult with the City Council due to the private nature 
of the scheme. 165 This highlighted the different positions the two held on the role of 
the local authorities in the provision of a metro. Cottrell took to local newspapers to 
decry ‘we haven’t just drawn this scheme on the back of an envelope, we have been 
talking in detail with local authorities for the past year and everyone has known of the 
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Metro for the last eight years’ in reaction to the City Council’s initial response.166 
Attempts to reduce the overall cost of the project with the move to trams and a lack of 
understanding by the local authorities on how private finance could contribute to 
transport had both combined to cause the biggest initial problems for the project. 
Other opponents included the Cycling group ‘Cyclebag’ and the Easton 
Community Association. Both feared the loss of the Bristol to Bath Railway Path, 
outlined as a future route of the metro.167 Bristol Civic Society, which supported the 
idea of an underground system, objected to the use of trams due to the perceived 
effect this would have on traffic in the city centre.168 Yet  the most sustained opposition 
to the metro came from Dawn Primarolo, Labour MP for Bristol South. Primarolo was 
a Bennite who had replaced former Chief Whip, Michael Cocks, as the DLP’s 
candidate in 1985 when he was deselected by the district party for being too centrist.169 
Primarolo bitterly opposed the metro, disagreeing with the entire concept of a private 
company building and operating a public transportation system and promised to fight 
the bill through parliament.170 Opposition from the entire DLP quickly followed and it 
voted to oppose the project on the same basis.171 ATA then entrenched old rivalries 
by recruiting  Michael Cocks himself, now Lord Cocks of Hartcliffe, to its board, making 
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this also a battle of personalities.172 This brought the Labour-led City Council, as well 
as the Labour group on the County Council, into resolute opposition to the project. 
This highlighted the depth of influence of the left of the Labour party in Bristol and the 
strong party discipline which had been caused partly by the balkanisation of 
government in the region and also in reaction to policies undertaken by the Thatcher 
government to reduce the role of local government and promote private finance. 
The City Council was concurrently fighting proposals to create an UDC in the 
city which would remove control over a large area of the city from the council.173 So 
the compulsory purchase powers ATA sought also represented a further erosion of its 
powers as it threatened to take land from the council as it owned the track bed. Fighting 
the metro became a way of opposing the Thatcher governments agenda of 
marginalising local government and encouraging private finance played out on a local 
stage. In addition, the City Council also held concerns that the project would 
undermine the council’s independence as the planning authority. Andrew May, deputy 
leader of the council, questioned the pressure that planning gain would place on the 
council’s planning department: 
 raising sums of this magnitude must mean an in-built pressure 
to get the maximum value out of any adjacent site. What happens if 
the City Council prefers, say, open space, or leisure or recreational 
uses or indeed any other less commercial use? 174  
 
Primarolo meanwhile argued that ATA was just a front for property speculators 
who would benefit from the increase in value of their developments.175 She criticised 
the powers that would be given to a private company and the lack of scrutiny from the 
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pursuit of private bills which evaded any form of local inquiry.176 She argued that the 
private nature of the metro would mean services would only run along profitable routes 
rather than provide a public service.177 As the first project of this nature, there were 
clear questions and fears about the impact on development, operations and control 
that came with the metro being privately owned and this formed initial resistance to 
the project highlighting the contested nature of neoliberal ideas. 
Primarolo also felt that ATA was a method to entrench the ideology of the 
Thatcher government. During the commons debate on the second reading of the bill, 
Primarolo evidenced this with a letter she had accidently received from Conservative 
MP Jerry Wiggins, sponsor of the bill. This letter, designed to encourage Conservative 
MPs to support the bill, stated: ‘A number of the far left on Bristol City Council are 
opposed to private enterprise providing transport solutions…. similar proposals for 
other cities could be damaged if [Primarolo] is able to defeat us’.178 Michael Portillo, 
Minister for Public Transport, responded that ‘[the government] welcome’s the private 
sector initiative on which the project is based. That accords closely with the 
Government’s wish to see the private sector involved to the greatest possible extent 
in the efficient provision of public transport’.179 The model that ATA had presented, 
therefore, was seen by the government as a template for further retrenchment of the 
public sector by passing the provision of rail-based public transport to the private 
sector. This was well in advance of the eventual privatisation of the railways in 1997.  
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Primarolo’s distrust further increased as commercial confidentiality was used 
by ATA to explain why it could not provide details of funding. Her suspicions on the 
company’s viability were heightened by reports that ATA were considering applying 
for a government grant in April 1988 to contribute towards construction.180 This raised 
the possibility that the local authority would be expected to contribute to the project via 
matched funding, as was normal for a government grant, despite not being involved. 
This undermined the whole concept of ATA as privately funded project.181 ATA denied 
that it was applying for government money, yet this did little to soothe Primarolo’s, and 
by extension the DLP’s, concerns about the viability of a privately funded metro 
scheme.182 The idea of a privately financed metro, had become about more than 
improving mobility and reducing congestion in the city, it was about how far the 
governments neoliberal agenda could extend and how far it could be fought against. 
Jack Penrose, a consultant to ATA who also contributed to Manchester’s Metrolink, 
reflected that:  
It was different and new and that was its strength, but it was 
also its weakness because it’s very hard to get political parties of 
any persuasion if they don’t know or have a hand on the funding of 
it in political terms. You don’t get a lot of support.183 Nearly all the 
public debates and so on were about who was funding it and who 
was behind it, which, looking back, is rather pathetic and sad but, 
nevertheless, that was it. It wasn’t a flawed system. It was a political 
system. It was a system that only certain politics and politicians 
could support.184 You have to understand almost what the 
atmosphere was like to understand why people were taking certain 
reactions. It became a political issue and not a question of whether 
it was the right system.185 
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Despite strong opposition, ATA did attempt to appease both local authorities. 
Avon County Council, at this time led by a coalition of Conservative and Alliance 
councillors were able to outvote their Labour colleagues and withdrew opposition to 
the project in February 1988 after receiving assurances and undertakings from the 
company to protect its interests.186 The County Council subsequently adopted a policy 
of joint working with ATA on the second bill resulting in close collaboration and the 
council finally investigated adopting LRT as council policy.187 The Labour-led City 
Council, meanwhile, maintained its opposition to the bill over the powers it would give 
ATA and over ATA’s ‘cavalier’ attitude towards the council with a lack of 
consultation.188 This opposition continued despite the City Council receiving advice 
that an objection based on a lack of consultation would be considered ‘a thing of the 
past’ and in addition to advice from the City Clerk that by October 1988 ATA had given 
enough assurances for the Council to withdraw its petition.189  
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It would take until March 1989 for the City Council to finally withdraw its petition 
following agreement with ATA to lease the trackbed into the city centre at a peppercorn 
rent.190 The act would achieve royal assent only two months after this, showing the 
extent the City Council had held up the bill.191 Yet, despite the strength of opposition 
by the City Council, the procedure for private bills meant that the City Council was 
required to negotiate parliamentary undertakings, specific agreements over specific 
concerns, with ATA and could not block progress on the metro completely. ATA’s 
recrafting of transport governance meant that the local authorities could not stop the 
project on principle. They had to negotiate for ATA to accept a concern and agree to 
manage that concern; something that the local authorities, which had long held power 
over transport policy, now had to recognise and adapt to.  
 ATA’s recrafting of transport governance between 1987 and 1989 was, 
therefore, ultimately successful in achieving the passage of the first Avon Light Rail 
Transit Act through Parliament. Using private bills meant that, whilst objections could 
be made to specific areas of a bill where there was a concern, ATA could negotiate 
parliamentary undertakings to deal with the complaint. Objections were based on 
either a concern over lack of consultation, caused by the short time span before ATA 
were required to submit the first bill, or by ideological opposition to the nature of the 
project and its impact on local governance in the region. These negotiations between 
the company and the council, however, delayed the passage of the bill, and added 
costs but could not stop the bill completely. This showed that whilst ATA’s recrafting 
of transport governance was successful, those in opposition could make this process 
expensive by making negotiations protracted. The County Council came to see the 
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project as the solution to ineffective financing, whilst the City Council, despite deep 
opposition, was unable to block the project. If ATA had more time before the 
submission of its first bill to consult, it could have faced less opposition from the county 
tier, but this would not have helped the attitude of the city tier which opposed the 
project on its neoliberal principles. Despite this, the new model that ATA had shown 
that private bills could be successfully pursued to give private enterprise the power to 
own and construct a metro system without the involvement of local government. 
 
The changing attitude towards the automobile and mobility in the urban 
centre and the development of Advanced Transport for Avon, 1986 – 
1989. 
Between 1979 and 1985, Cottrell failed to persuade Avon County Council to 
adopt a metro system to solve congestion in Bristol. The council’s answer to traffic 
congestion in the urban centre was to advocate for the construction of more road 
space.192 Yet by 1986 attitudes towards the car began to shift. Both the City Council 
and County Council recognised the problems unmanaged proliferation of the 
automobile had caused and offered competing solutions. The City Council wanted 
greater pedestrianisation of the city’s civic and entertainment centre, around the city 
cathedral and St Augustine’s Parade, to improve the urban environment.193 Andrew 
May, deputy leader of the council, argued that Bristol was now excessively dominated 
by the selfish use of the motorcar.194 The County Council, meanwhile, proposed linking 
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75 sets of traffic lights to a computer-controlled system. Warren Fowler, Chairman of 
the County Council’s Planning, Highways and Transport Committee highlighted the 
need to manage traffic carefully to prevent gridlock with a similar system cutting rush 
hour delays by 50% in Southampton.195 
Neither plan offered a comprehensive solution to the city’s traffic problems and 
as a result Cottrell resurrected the idea of a metro as a third option to solve the problem 
of traffic in the urban centre. This section explores how attitudes to the automobile 
developed in response to the Avon Metro in this period. It also explores how the metro 
concept itself evolved to provide a more feasible solution to Bristol’s traffic problems 
and how other alternatives to the car started to develop in turn as a result of the idea 
of the metro concept looking like it could be fulfilled. 
By 1986, British cities started to imitate German approaches to mitigate the 
impact of the car in the urban centre. This included the improvement of public 
transportation, the expansion of pedestrianised areas and cycling routes, and 
restriction of car use in the urban centre.196 Yet these ideas were adopted slower and 
on a more limited scale in the United Kingdom when compared to Germany, whilst 
cycling remained hardly visible in British policy discourse.197 This was replicated in 
Bristol. The City Council’s pedestrianisation proposals were limited to a small section 
of the city centre and eventually reduced in scope. The provision of bus-only routes in 
the city extended to a small area around the main shopping quarter and was not 
replicated elsewhere.198 Plans were formulated to restrict on-street parking and resist 
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calls to increase road space but this was not implemented widely.199 One of the few 
successes for cycling during this period was the opening of the Bristol and Path 
Railway Path, constructed along the route of a disused railway line that linked the two 
cities. This was, however, the work of a local cycling advocacy group and not part of 
any national or local strategy. It was clear that attitudes were beginning to change 
between 1986 and 1989 with a growing focus on weighing the advantages of personal 
mobility against land requirements, the damage to the urban environment and the 
pollution cars caused.200 Yet there was not a comprehensive plan to implement 
change decisively or on a large scale and progress continued at a slower pace than in 
German cities. The Avon Metro was positioned by Cottrell as a much more effective 
and comprehensive plan to improve the urban environment on a scale that neither 
council appeared able to achieve.  
After the initial launch in 1986, ATA refined its plans were refined over the 
course of a year with the company changing the mode of the system from underground 
railway a street-running tramway.201 This was, as previous described, based primarily 
on reducing the overall cost of the system, building on developments in Manchester 
and London.202 Tramways also had other benefits and became the preferred solution 
in the 1980s for large transportation projects in big cities. They improved air quality, 
being electrically run, and they provided mobility links and opportunities for 
regeneration, being relatively easy to extend to redevelopment sites at a lower cost 
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than fully segregated, underground, systems.203 Trams were also held in a higher 
esteem by the travelling public than buses, resulting in a ‘tram bonus’ which 
encouraged greater ridership.204 Jack Penrose, elaborated on the reasons for the 
changing shift to trams: ‘in Manchester, there was a feeling that the one way that 
should be pursued would be a tram system because that, in a sense, bridged between 
rail and car and movement and high capacity in pre-determined routes’.205 This new 
generation of trams were able to provide high capacity alternatives to the car directly 
into the city centre, and were capable of swift travel to the suburbs via existing railway 
routes. Something which buses were unable to do.  
In his interview with the Evening Post on the 28th October 1987, Cottrell 
highlighted the benefits of trams: ‘we are bringing back the tram, no, we are reinventing 
the tram. Ours will be clean, pollution-free, quiet, comfortable…. Supertrams!’.206 
Figure 9., released the day of this interview shows how ATA intended to integrate its 
trams within the local urban environment; taking road space from the automobile in 
the centre and providing a sleek new look to the city. Despite these benefits, however, 
by updating the metro proposals to reflect contemporary thinking on metro systems, 
ATA had left too little time between announcement and submission of the first bill for 
the differences between modes to be evaluated by the authorities.207 Additionally, 
groups such as Bristol Civic Society, supportive of the idea of an underground, now 
turned against the project. Members of the society wrote letters and contributed 
opinion pieces to the local media, and organised hostile public meetings on the 
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proposals.208 Jack Penrose reflected on these, calling them ‘the first time ever in my 
life I've been shouted down at a public meeting and called a liar and all sorts of 
things’.209 This highlighted the organisation of vocal opposition groups to the metro. 
Whilst previous studies of the metro have focused on the controversial elements of 
financing and governance, none have identified the change in mode in being a 
significant factor in creating opposition to the project. This showed that there was 
significant opposition and resistance to changing the surface layout of the city as 
Bristol Civic Society had been happy to support a public transport system that was 
‘hidden’ beneath the streets but opposed a tramway that would ‘annex’ road space 
from the automobile. This showed the limitations as to how far it was acceptable to 
redesign the city away from the car at this point.  
The proposed use of railway lines around the city brought other problems. With 
increasing congestion on the roads, long-abandoned railway lines around the city had 
started to increase in value as potential traffic-free routes, but there were different 
ideas on what these should be used for. One example was the Portishead Line, the 
focus of the first bill. The City Council saw the potential of using this route to connect 
its dock at Portbury with the national rail network. The proximity of this is shown in 
figure 10., with ATA’s proposed route to Portishead shown as a dashed line and the 
spur required to connect this route to the docks shown as a thin black line beyond Pill.  
The City Council had held the right to use this route for sixteen years and not done so 
but used this as another opportunity to block progress on the metro.210 After railway 
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routes had been closed, it was left to the local authorities to decide whether to protect 
these routes or not. Often these were just left disused, overgrown and abandoned but 
now their value in providing a traffic-free alternative route into the city centre was 
beginning to be understood. Yet, with no masterplan to look after and protect these 
assets, however, conflict emerged over different ideas for the use of these routes. Yet 
this event did form the basis of using an alternative to the road in the region to transport 
goods to be taken seriously in reaction to the metro concept.  
85 
 
Figure. 9. Artist’s impression - Advanced Transport for Avon Supertram and integration in the city centre.211
                                                             




Figure. 10. The Portishead Line. 212 
 
ATA eventually came to an agreement with the City Council to use the 
Portishead line and offered to upgrade it to handle both passenger and freight traffic 
as a compromise.213 Disagreements with both the City Council and the Bristol Civic 
Society however had shown how ideas to provide alternatives to the car along 
segregated routes were forced to fight for precedence with each other and were 
deemed to be a lower priority than reducing space for the automobile in the city centre.  
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In summary, during this time there was a growing realisation that something 
had to be done about the problem of the car by both tiers of local government in the 
region. The plans presented, however, were not ambitious or comprehensive enough 
when compared to what cities in Germany were doing and caused disagreements 
between tiers. In reaction, the Avon Metro proposals of 1979 were repackaged and 
presented, once again, as the solution to the city’s traffic problems and as a radical 
concept to promote regeneration. ATA adapted the proposals from an underground 
railway to street-running tramway, to lower the cost once again taking inspiration from 
other systems and provided greater capacity and speed than a bus network. This late 
change in mode provided problems as the tiers of local government were left with a 
short amount of time to assess the impact of this change. This lead to petitions of 
objection in Parliament to the bill. Conflict also arose over exactly what disused railway 
lines should be used for, with a lack of plans for their use and imagination over their 
potential. There was also conflict caused by the proposals for the metro to take space 
from the automobile in the urban centre. Yet by 1989, unrestrained dominance of the 
car in the urban centre was starting to break down through attempts by both tiers to 
mitigate the impact of the car, but this process was slowed down by the continued 









Conclusions from Chapter Two 
This chapter examined the recrafting of transport governance along neoliberal 
principles by ATA and its implementation between 1986 and 1989. It also examined 
how attitudes towards the car were starting to change during this period. In doing so it 
identifies key developments to add to historical scholarship.  
In the context of a growing realisation of the impact of the motorcar on the city 
centre, a lack of funding and a lack of vision to create an effective solution to the 
problems of the car, the Avon Metro was once again presented as an alternative and 
more effective concept. Yet this time private finance would solve the issues of funding 
construction and a private company would provide the vision and leadership to 
implement it. As such, ATA presented an alternative model for transport governance 
that reused the methodology for the construction of Britain’s original railway network 
– the use of private acts of parliament and combined it with a reduced role for local 
authorities. It also intended to make use of private finance in a way that built on the 
developing neoliberal agenda and the promotion of the free-market as the provider 
rather than the state. This resulted in a unique expression of neoliberalism which 
surpassed the government’s current policies. Whereas the UDCs would reduce the 
role of the local authorities and provided the basis for regeneration, they were still 
appointed by central government. ATA sought to promote regeneration without any 
involvement from central or local government aside from the passing of the private 
acts. In this sense the project validates Brenner and Theodore’s assertion that 






Opposition to the project came from opposition to central government policies 
that promoted neoliberalism. The City Council therefore found several opportunities to 
resist this agenda based on ideology and not necessarily on concept. An example 
being resistance for use of the Portishead Line despite the council holding the power 
to use this themselves for over 16 years and not doing so. Yet, despite this opposition, 
ATA was able to prove within this period that this new concept for transport 
governance that broke away from the restrictive structures of government and lack of 
funding could be successful. This can be seen through the gaining of permission for 
the first stage of the project. With developers willing to regenerate the area of 
Portishead Power Station and pay for the development of the metro as part of this 
regeneration a more advanced form of neoliberalism was on the verge of being 
successful that went beyond what the UDCs intended to do by handing more control 
for regeneration over to private finance and reducing the role of local government 
without central government involvement. 
ATA refined its concept to a street-running tramway system in the city centre to 
reduce the costs that construction of an underground tunnel would entail. This 
reflected a trend seen in other cities. Yet this change caused groups such as the Bristol 
Civic Society to complain about a public transport system that would run on the surface 
and compete for road space with the automobile. This showed that there was still 
strong resistance against a concept that would compete with the automobile with the 
preference being for a public transport system that remain ‘hidden’. This showed the 
continued support for the dominance of the car. Additionally, the use of the Portishead 
Line became a fight over who should be allowed to use this route as opposed to 
cooperation and shared use between ATA and the Council for mutual benefit. This 
showed how the automobile still maintained dominance in the transport network of the 





The fall: The second bill and the bankruptcy and demise of 
Advanced Transport for Avon, May 1989 – March 1992 
 
Despite opposition between 1986 and 1989, ATA had been successful in 
navigating the first Avon Light Rail Transit Act through parliament, it gaining royal 
assent in May 1989.214 ATA had reflected and built upon the neoliberal restructuring 
of the economy under Thatcher to take concepts such as the minimal state, private 
ownership of the means of production and the importance of the market even further 
than had been achieved previously. As such, ATA was pioneering a method of urban 
regeneration that would be achieved financially and politically independent of central 
government policy unlike the Urban Development Corporations which required central 
government funding in their set-up. ATA therefore recrafted transport governance and 
providing a road map to the greater implementation of neoliberalism.  
 
Before construction could begin, ATA required a second act to secure rights to run 
through the city centre. This would make the project viable forming the basis of a 
working metro system with a cross-city link and would be the most critical and 
technically challenging part of the project. Between 1989 and 1992, ATA would be 
able to avoid the strong political opposition faced previously. The company learnt that 
completely excluding the local authorities created tensions and sought a more 
collaborative approach with both tiers of local government. This process had already 
begun before the passage of the first bill with ATA and the County Council working 
together on the design of the city centre section of the route.215 With weakening 
political opposition to ATA, there was the opportunity for the metro to finally be 
realised.  
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Other challenges emerged. Cottrell failed to secure re-election to his European 
Parliament seat having been arrested shortly before the election for refusing to wear 
his seatbelt on an aircraft.216 He subsequently resigned as Chairman of ATA within a 
year resulting in the company losing its frontman.217 Economic conditions also 
deteriorated with the start of a recession and a housing slump that threatened to delay 
the developments that ATA hoped to raise financing from.218 Delays in passing the 
first act had already made ATA’s investors nervous about how long it would take to 
see a return on their investment and further delays had the potential for them to 
withdraw backing.219 ATA also faced new opponents as the project sought permission 
to run through the urban centre. Many more people and groups became affected by 
the project and, as a result, the number of petitions increased. A sustained campaign 
was led by the cycling advocacy group Cyclebag to protect the Bristol to Bath Railway 
Path, which ATA intended to obtain powers to run the metro over.220 The metro also 
faced other private companies seeking to replicate its model with competing plans to 
tackle congestion in the city. One of these, Guided Light Transit (GLT), a guided bus 
proposal led by the local bus company, Badgerline, offered a metro system with similar 
benefits at a much-reduced cost.221 
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This final chapter examines the development of ATA from May 1989 to its eventual 
failure in March 1992. It explores how its new model of neoliberal transport governance 
and financing came to be accepted by both tiers of local government but would 
ultimately not be implemented and the reasons for this.222 This chapter also examines 
how changing attitudes towards the car and the debate on mobility in the city which 
ATA created eventually acted as a catalyst for new transport developments in the city 
up to 1992 which contributed towards its demise. 
 
The acceptance of the new structure of neoliberal transport governance 
and the limitations of this structure, 1989 – 1992. 
In November 1989, ATA deposited its next two bills in Parliament 
simultaneously, making up for time lost in the passage of the first act. The first bill for 
running powers in the city centre – the Avon Light Rail Transit (Bristol City Centre Bill), 
the second for powers to extend the system towards the fringe towns of Yate and 
Bradley Stoke – the Avon Light Rail Transit Bill no.2.223  The routes of these bills are 
shown in figure 7. The City Council once again threatened to lodge petitions of 
objection in Parliament to both bills, continuing the ideological fight against neoliberal 
projects also shown by its continued opposition to a UDC in the city.224 Primarolo 
continued to argue that the system would face a funding crisis and that there were no 
government grants available to support the project when it would inevitably struggle.225  
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ATA attempted to change this narrative, having learnt from complaints of a lack 
of consultation on the first bill. It offered both the City Council and County Council joint 
venture agreements in October 1989 allowing greater involvement in decision-making 
on the metro and an interest in the company.226 This modified the model away from 
operating independently of the local authorities in the region and towards closer 
involvement with them. The County Council signed an agreement, subsequently 
undertaking study work and seconding council employees to work with ATA.227 The 
City Council, however, refused to sign arguing that it would not have any opportunity 
to contribute meaningfully to the project due to not having any powers over transport 
policy in the region. It voted instead to block progress on the City Centre Bill citing a 
lack of information supplied.228 This showed the problems in Avon’s structure whereby 
the power to address the city’s transport interests lay with the County Council, not the 
City Council and a private company had now gaining more influence and power over 
the direction of transport planning than the City Council, a body elected to represent 
the citizens of the city. Additionally the City Council refused to engage with this 
company despite attempts to involve it arguing it had not received enough information 
about the project. This highlighted that opposition was about ideology and not solving 
concerns about the metro as a concept.  It looked like the beginning of another 
attritional fight with the City Council. 
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Suddenly, on 6th January 1990, City Councillors voted to lift opposition to the 
metro.229 Yet within days, opposition to the metro was reinforced by a vote in the DLP 
following a meeting that passed with a majority of one.230 Deep divisions were forming 
within the DLP about how to approach the metro. The Bennite dominance of the DLP 
had been loosened by internal party elections in 1989 which had shifted power towards 
moderates resulting in a sharp split in the DLP.231 Even stern critics of ATA, such as 
Andrew May, began to accept the role of private finance in the provision of public 
transportation in Bristol. When opposition was re-imposed by the DLP, he resigned as 
deputy leader of the council citing the need to reach a compromise agreement with 
ATA.232  
In March 1990, the DLP finally ended its block on the progress of the bills 
through Parliament. This allowed greater consultation between the City Council and 
ATA.233 Following this, the DLP changed its attitude towards neoliberal projects in 
Bristol. This resulted in the City Council negotiating a deal to privatise the Port of 
Bristol, dropping its fight against the UDC’s attempt to build a new spine road across 
its development site and forging a new partnership with the UDC after three years of 
bitter opposition in addition to dropping plans to petition against the metro.234 Primarolo 
also ceased public statements of opposition to the project. This development reflected 
the movement of the Labour Party nationally, which had begun to move towards the 
political centre ground following the general election of 1987. Whilst this process was 
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virtually complete by 1989, the dominance of Bennites in the Bristol DLP had delayed 
this process locally to 1990.235 Political opposition to the metro had now receded due 
to this but other threats to the project had already started to emerge from 1989 with 
the beginning of an economic recession.  
In October 1989 Brian Tucker had warned that any further delays to the metro 
bills could result in the metro’s financial backers pulling out of the project.236 Even with 
the City Council removing its opposition to the project in March 1990, ATA faced a 
total of fifty-eight petitions of objections to the bills in Parliament.237 The first act, had 
only affected the two councils and British Rail due to the Portishead Line running 
through the Avon Gorge where there were no homes or businesses. The petitions for 
the next stage, however, were due to the project seeking permission to run through 
the city centre and the densely populated suburbs. Petitions were lodged by residents, 
businesses and local influence groups as a result. ATA was required to consult with 
each petitioner and agree parliamentary undertakings individually over concerns; 
delaying the progress of the metro bills through Parliament and adding further costs.238 
Additional problems emerged as the unfolding economic recession of the late 1980s 
particularly hit the housing market and the West of England.239 This resulted in, 
developers being less eager to build property, which was how ATA had planned to 
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raise the finances to construct the system using planning gain.240 ATA now had to 
adapt its plans to raise finances to construct the metro.   
ATA announced in September 1989 that it was applying for a government grant 
to aid construction of the metro.241 By May 1990, ATA estimated it would need 
£150million in government funding, between 60 and 65 percent of the cost of the 
overall system. The City and County Council’s estimated this would need to be closer 
to 90%.242 The application for a grant in 1989 had been encouraged by Transport 
Junior Minister, Michael Portillo, but this completely undermined the concept of the 
Avon Metro being a ‘free-gift’ to the city of Bristol.243  
These developments highlighted the limitations of ATA’s new model of transport 
governance to secure funding from the private sector by capturing the increase in land 
values from the development of the metro. With companies not building developments 
due to the recession, ATA could not access funding from them. Developments would 
need to be of a large enough scale to cover the cost of construction which increased 
risk and attempts by ATA to forge close relations with developers had previously left 
the company open to accusations that it was a front for property speculators.244 ATA 
also realised the need to have had a closer relationship, earlier on, with the planning 
tier of local government to obtain planning permission for large-scale developments 
as there was no guarantee that these types of developments would be approved. 
ATA’s model was undermined by developers being unable to develop land through 
either lack of permission or demand due to the recession meaning ATA was unable to 
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access funds. By changing strategy and applying for government funds to contribute 
towards construction, the amount developers would be expected to contribute towards 
the cost of the metro would be reduced. ATA hoped this would reduce the risk for 
developers and incentivise them to start developments and then contribute private 
finance to the project. The problem with this approach however was that the rules for 
government grants for transport infrastructure under the Transport Act, (1968) required 
the local authority to also contribute funding.245 There was also no template for a 
private company receiving a transport infrastructure grant as this legislation was 
designed for where a local authority would be leading the construction of transport 
infrastructure, as was the case in Tyne and Wear and Manchester. 
Despite hoping for support from the central government, in September 1991 the 
Secretary of State for Transport, Malcom Rifkind, announced that ATA would receive 
no government grant in the near future.246 The dual problems of an economic 
recession meaning that developers were less likely to build and the failure to obtain a 
government grant, effectively cut off ATA’s ability to raise finances to construct the 
system and, bar any miraculous new investors appearing, ATA was now in an 
impossible situation financially. ATA did keep promising that it was in talks with new 
investors, but by March 1992 the High Court ordered the company to be wound up.247 
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ATA’s financial problems caused two developments. First, the County Council, 
having adopted LRT as policy through the joint venture agreement and having paid for 
various studies towards a metro, now started to investigate bringing the project under 
its control in June 1991.248 Whilst ATA refused to sell at this point, following its collapse 
Avon County Council took on remnants of the project and attempted to fund it using 
the same model used to construct the Manchester Metrolink, renaming the project ‘the 
Westway’.249 The second development was that a private bus company, Badgerline, 
announced in September 1991 a rival attempt to build a metro at a much reduced 
cost.250 Its Guided Light Transit (GLT) system, consisting of a bus that could run on 
both normal roads and on a guided track where required, was estimated to cost 
£40million, a fraction of the cost of ATA.251 Badgerline hoped that asking for a smaller 
government grant to support the construction of GLT would be more likely to be 
successful. Whilst initially insisting that GLT could complement ATA’s proposals, GLT 
helped to hasten ATA’s demise by offering similar advantages at a lower cost. It also 
gained support from local interest groups such as the Bristol Civic Society.252 These 
developments showed that the idea of a metro was now accepted as a solution to 
Bristol’s traffic problems but different methods to achieve this were now starting to be 
conceptualised. 
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In summary, despite the weakening of political opposition to ATA during this 
period, the economic recession exposed the limitations of ATA’s model of transport 
governance. The acceptance of the role private finance to help fund urban transport 
infrastructure and regeneration came too late for ATA. Delays caused by opposition 
to the metro by the DLP, and by extension, the City Council had stretched the 
company’s funds. Whilst the onset of recession delayed developments intended to 
fund the construction of the system. Support from central government, which had 
wanted to see ATA’s model succeed, also evaporated. The brief window where 
conditions could have allowed ATA to be successful had passed and the economic 
and political landscape had changed. Yet the metro had, for a moment, shown that a 
new model of transport governance, not led by the local authorities, could work with 
the passing of the first act. The experience from opposition  led to ATA seeking greater 
involvement from both tiers of governance in the Avon region rather than attempting 
to completely by-pass these institutions. With this structure of co-operation and without 
the economic recession, this partnership could have successfully implemented a 
metro in the city and is similar to the model used to fund the 2020 Northern Line 
London Underground extension to Battersea.253 Yet by opening transport governance 
to organisations outside of the local authorities, ATA faced competition from concepts 
that promised to achieve similar results at a much lower cost with the GLT proposals 
which also hastened ATA’s demise showing another facet to introducing market forces 
into urban transport plans.   
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Advanced Transport for Avon and the changing nature of mobility and 
automobility in the urban centre, 1989 – 1992.  
The idea of an Avon Metro had, by 1992, successfully opened debate in the 
city of Bristol about offering effective alternatives to the car and a better urban 
environment. This had resulted in a shift in policy towards the urban design of the city 
centre. City planners were beginning to change the design of the city so that the 
negative aspects of the car were mitigated, rather than supporting the ‘predict and 
provide’ model of road building. Increased pedestrianisation efforts, a concerted effort 
to implement bus lanes to encourage public transport, a new understanding of the role 
of cycling in urban transport as well as the adoption of LRT as County Council policy 
all reflected this. Despite ATA’s failure, what can be considered its legacy was 
providing the environment for ideas of alternatives to the car to be presented, and, on 
occasion, implemented. This section examines the changing attitude towards mobility 
and the automobile within the urban centre and explores the role of ATA in these 
developments. 
By 1992, many transport problems still existed in the city. This included the cost 
of implementing a large-scale public transportation system, the paucity of traffic-free 
routes for alternatives to the car and the continued dominance of the automobile. Yet 
there was now a proliferation of projects presented aimed at improving mobility, 
reducing the impact of the car and improving the urban environment because of the 
metro concept. These ranged from the fanciful: cable-cars, monorails and electronic 
tolling charges, to the more serious: guided buses, park and ride schemes, the 




restoration of Queen Square. 254 The latter, the second largest Georgian Square in 
Europe, had had a dual carriageway constructed across it during the 1930s as part of 
the city’s inner circuit road, as shown in figure 11. Its removal was now deemed 
‘repairing an act of civic vandalism’ that had blighted one of the historic parts of the 
city.255  This showed a growing realisation of the damage the car had done to the city’s 
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Figure. 11.  Aerial photograph showing the Inner Circuit Road crossing Queen’s 
Square. 256 
 
The first new local plan for the city in 20 years drafted in the early 1990s sought 
to open-up the city centre to pedestrians and cyclists, reduce the impact of the car in 
the urban centre and introduce restrictions on parking to increase patronage of public 
transport.257 Yate, the overspill town, finally received its railway station, showing an 
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increased awareness of the use of rail in the city’s transport picture.258 These 
developments came following the metro sparking debate about mobility and the 
problem of the automobile in the urban centre. The city’s planners had become 
influenced by the same objectives of the metro of doing something about the 
unrestrained impact of the car. There were limitations to this. The only major road 
project proposed at this time, a £55million spine road across the Bristol Development 
site, quickly gained a £30million grant towards its construction. This showed that 
central government readily supported road projects but were more reticent in 
supporting concepts like the metro displaying how the dominance of the automobile 
was still strongly entrenched at the forefront of government decisions about transport 
infrastructure in the urban centre.259 
An additional, major, and up to now, little understood impact of ATA on shifting 
attitudes towards mobility was its impact on cycling as a mode of transport. Until the 
early 1990s, cycling’s position within UK transport policy discourse has been described 
as ‘hardly visible’.260 One of the few successes up to the mid-1980s being the 
construction of the Bristol to Bath Railway Path led by Cyclebag. The route, shown in 
figure 12, followed the route of the disused Bristol and Gloucester Railway line from 
the city centre towards the north east of the city, then followed the disused route of the 
Mangotsfield and Bath Branch Line to Bath. This provided a safe and segregated route 
connecting the two cities for walkers and cyclists away from traffic along a quiet, green 
path. Reusing this piece of disused railway infrastructure had also been included in 
plans for the Avon Metro from 1979 and was considered one of the key parts of the 
metro network for connections to Yate and Bath. As such, the route was included as 
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part of the Avon Light Rail Transit Bill no.2. submitted in 1989. In reaction conflict 
emerged between ATA and Cyclebag over what this route should be used for, similar 
to conflict between ATA and the City Council over the use of the Portishead Line. The 
difference here was that the running rails had already been removed and a path 
installed in its place by volunteers. The subsequent battle over the Railway Path would 
help shape national attitudes towards cycling on how it could contribute to the transport 
policy of urban centres.  
 
Cyclebag organised a sustained campaign to protect the Railway Path. The 
group’s figurehead, Chris Hutt, argued that ‘those of us who have worked for the last 
ten years to help create this popular path for cyclists and pedestrians are not about 
to sit back and watch our achievement disappear under the bulldozer of private 
commercial interests’.261 ATA, meanwhile insisted that cyclists, walkers and trams 
could share the route as re-use of this infrastructure was the only affordable option. 
This showed how disused railway lines had increased in value resulting in conflict 
over different transport modes claiming the same resource. For Cyclebag this was 
about preserving the rights of cyclists and promoting the bicycle as a mode of 
transport. The group argued that sharing the path would destroy the route and ATA’s 
proposals would result in difficulties accessing the path and were unsafe. It held 
concerns at plans for the Staple Hill tunnel, shown in figure 13, where cyclists would 
be forced to leave the path, cycle on busy roads and re-join the route after.262 This 
would completely undermine the intention of providing a safe route for cyclists with 
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Cyclebag undertaking a poster and letter writing campaign, galvanising other groups 
to protest against the metro and petitioned against the metro in Parliament.263 
Cyclebag were able to galvanise the local community to undertake a sustained 
campaign highlighting the importance of protecting cycling infrastructure in the city. It 
organised rallies to the council offices, collected petitions and organised public 
meetings in the areas along the route of the path.264 It also argued that the metro would 
lead to ten years of chaos in the city centre as the system was constructed.265 Jack 
Penrose, consult to ATA, explained the problems created by different claims to the 
path: 
There was a fear element in it. You can see the other argument, you’ve 
got a marvellous route between Bristol and Bath to take away a hell of 
a lot of the traffic with trams going to and fro, it could have been 
accommodated but we didn’t get far enough, and I don’t think it was 
handled as well as it could have been…. I think both ATA and the cycle 
fraternity could have done much more to alleviate some of the fears 
on this because when it was proposed to go down the route, there 
were pictures of children and people on bicycles all being crushed by 
trams.266  
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Figure. 13. The entry portal to the Staple Hill Tunnel.268
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The group bitterly condemned the metro’s claims that it was an environmentally 
acceptable alternative to the private car, with Chris Hutt arguing that ‘cycling already 
accounts for as many journeys in Avon as ATA claim will be made on the metro’.269 
Cyclebag had its own vision of a network of cyclepaths and greenways around the city 
and it was clear that losing the Railway Path would mean that cycling would not be 
taken seriously enough for the implementation of these.270 The fight over the Railway 
Path was about where cycling stood in the transport hierarchy and its advocates 
attempts to gain it a more valued position. Cyclebag forced ATA to undertake a study 
examining other routes the metro could take to preserve the Railway Path, but ATA 
continued to insist that this was the most cost-effective route.271 Eventually in June 
1991, Cyclebag’s campaign forced ATA to put plans to use the Railway Path on hold 
to focus on other, simpler, routes into the city.272 This represented a landmark success 
for cycling. The tactics used by Cyclebag in promoting cycling and the protection of 
cycle routes would be replicated by Sustrans across the country proving to have long-
term implications for cycling as a mode of transport.273 Sustrans would, by the early 
1990s, gain £43.5million in government funding to create the ‘National Cycle Network’, 
with the Railway Path forming the very first section.274 The group would continue to 
help shape cycling infrastructure through to the present day as a result. The fight over 
the Railway Path had formed a vital stage in cycling’s development and represented 
the first key victory for cycling and the realisation that it could form an important and 
viable contributor to the transport policy agenda within cities. 
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 ATA also acted as a catalyst for other ideas on how to implement a cost-
effective metro. In 1986 the company had changed mode for the metro from an 
underground railway to street-running trams based on reducing the cost of the system. 
In 1991, Badgerline announced its GLT concept developing this idea further, offering 
the same high-capacity, high-speed service that ATA offered at a fraction of the cost. 
The concept, shown in figure 14, was for a long single-decker bus divided into three 
sections, that could run on either a segregated path, using a guided rail and under 
electric power, or on roads using a diesel engine. This gave the concept the flexibility 
to run on roads and bus lanes in the city centre where installing dedicated 
infrastructure would be costly or contentious, whilst outside the city centre it could use 
disused railway lines where they were available. This would lower the cost of providing 
a metro to around £40 million in the hope that this lower figure might convince the 
government to provide Badgerline with a grant towards the systems construction.275 
This showed the increasing importance of overall cost within mass transit projects.  
GLT also took inspiration, as the Avon Metro had once done, from the continent 
and gained widespread support soon after its announcement; particularly from groups 
in opposition to the metro such as Bristol Civic Society. This showed how cost, 
flexibility and less radical proposals were important to schemes obtaining support in 
the city. Yet, despite the original intention of GLT complimenting the metro, it proved 
to be one of the final factors which contributed to the loss of faith in ATA as public 
momentum started to shift towards this system and through ATA’s continued financial 
problems.276 In ATA’s dying days another project was launched which proposed to use 
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the Portishead Line, which ATA already had permission to use from the first act, to run 
another guided bus route along.277 This showed a growing inclination for public 
transportation companies to promote bus-based metro solutions as a less contentious 
and cheaper option to implement than light rail. 
 
Figure. 14.  Guided Light Transit Bus show bus on segregated pathway.278 
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In summary, between 1989 and 1992, the Avon Metro had successfully acted as a 
catalyst to opening debate within the city of Bristol about the need to improve its 
transport infrastructure. Car dominance in the city was beginning to break down as the 
authorities recognised the impact of the car on the urban centre, finally reacting to the 
original message of the metro. Significant developments in restraining the car occurred 
including the return of Queen Square to a public space - removing a key aspect of the 
city’s Inner Circuit Road, and the adoption of policies aimed at reducing the impact of 
the car and promoting public transport. There had been an increased focus on 
alternatives to the car, with a plethora now available. Yet alternatives to the car 
continued to come into conflict as seen by the fight over the Railway Path. Even in 
defeat over this conflict, ATA contributed to an important development by giving 
Cyclebag a platform to promote the role of cycling. This helped cycling to emerge as 
a recognised and valuable part of the transport agenda both locally and nationally. 
Lastly the lessons learnt about reducing the overall cost of a metro system were also 
taken up by other private companies, as seen by the GLT system, which promised to 
provide similar metro benefits at a lower cost and greater flexibility than a rail-based 
metro. Whilst this would undermine support for the metro and contribute to the 
schemes collapse, the GLT project had learnt several lessons from the Avon metro 
proposals.279 Eventually, in 2006, it would be a version of this that would be adopted 
by the West of England Partnership as the version of the metro which would be built, 
opening to the public in 2018 under the name ‘Metrobus’.  
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Conclusions from Chapter Three 
This chapter charted the changing fortunes of ATA’s neoliberal recrafting of 
transport governance between 1989 and 1992 and examined why the project 
ultimately failed. It has also examined how the Avon Metro concept started to influence 
other transport developments within the city of Bristol and influence policy leaders to 
reshape the city away from dominance by the automobile. In doing so, several key 
developments are identified. 
ATA modified its neoliberal recrafting of transport governance to include a role 
for the tiers of local governance in the region. This was a step-away from the original 
plan to evade these institutions completely and instead sought greater co-operation. 
This hybrid model showed that despite the Thatcher government’s attempts to 
diminish the importance of local government, its influence remained important. In fact, 
a different, more palatable model for neoliberal urban regeneration was created with 
the private sector reacting to local circumstances and working with local government 
and not working in isolation from local government as seen in the UDCs. Whilst ATA 
presented a less radical concept in this period, the project remained radical in nature 
as the Avon Metro idea was still led by a private company which was different to any 
other transport project in the UK at this time. 
Whilst the methodology to obtain a metro had proved feasible and local 
governmental opposition was reduced, the company was unfortunate in facing an 
economic recession which restricted ability to gain finance from developments to fund 
construction of the system. This showed the weakness in ATA’s model. Private finance 
is dependent on market conditions; when the market faced a downturn, the funding 




system, via a grant, it declined to do so due to the rules for grants not keeping pace 
with ATA’s model. Neoliberal policies pursued by the government, such as the UDC’s 
still required initial governmental help to encourage urban regeneration to take place, 
but no governmental help was forthcoming in this case – partly due to legislation for 
grants not keeping up with developments such as ATA’s model. Therefore, the failure 
of ATA was a multi-layered failure of both the market and the state. Despite this, it had 
been successful in showing that there was the potential for a privately-funded and 
privately-led concept with greater financing to follow this model.  
The real impact of ATA’s model had been to stimulate interest in solving the 
problems in the urban transport fabric of the city. Other private companies started to 
offer transport solutions, such as Badgerline and the GLT system and this highlighted 
the importance of cost as well as quality. Whilst GLT was not the ultimate reason for 
ATA’s failure, it was proof of the difficulties of introducing market forces into urban 
transport infrastructure provision. Another solution was the local government finally 
starting to take improving urban transportation seriously with the move away from a 
car dominated model of city design and towards a multi-modal approach. The County 
Council finally adopted LRT as policy, something that Cottrell had been calling for all 
the way back to 1979, and a variety of projects were undertaken to begin to restrain 
the impact of the car. The return of Queen Square to a public space being one example 
of efforts to redesign the urban centre into a ‘people friendly’ space with the pedestrian 
at its heart rather than the car. 
A third, unexpected, result of the development of the metro in this period had 
been the future effect on cycling policy both locally and nationally seen through events 
involving the Railway Path. The metro also changed perceptions of the value of the 




caused Cyclebag to perfect a campaign to protect this route and defend the 
importance of cycling. This acted as a starting point for recognition of the importance 
of cycling with the Railway Path becoming one of the key parts of the national cycle 
network as a result. Cycling infrastructure would also, subsequently, be extended into 
cities, improving the urban environment and redesigning the city away from the car in 




















Post-script - After Advanced Transport for Avon 
Richard Cottrell’s concept of an Avon Metro was never realised. Yet it did open a 
conversation in the city of Bristol about how to solve the city’s transport problems that 
continues to this day. The newest proposal, by the City Council, is for a city-wide 
underground network to be operational within the next ten years, costing in the region 
of £4billion.280 This return to the concept of an underground railway brings the metro 
idea full-circle back to the original 1979 proposals and is the latest project that aims to 
see the realisation of a metro in the city.  
Following ATA’s failure, Avon County Council adapted ATA’s metro plans into 
‘the Westway’ project, however Avon was abolished following reform of local 
government before construction could begin. Next, Bristol City Council, working with 
its newly created neighbour South Gloucestershire Council, drew up plans for a 
‘supertram’ between the city centre and the north of the city.281 This project was 
eventually dropped in 2004 following disagreements between the two councils over 
the exact route the supertram should take.282 By 2008, the City Council, working with 
new regional organisation the West of England Partnership, proposed the concept of 
Bus Rapid Transport (BRT) – similar to GLT, as the solution to Bristol’s transport 
problems.283 In the early stages of this project, the council proposed a route running 
on the Bristol to Bath Railway Path which was quickly shelved following wide-spread 
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protests, led by Sustrans.284 Despite this early setback, the rest of this system has 
been constructed and is due to open in early-2018 following controversy over cost 
increases, disruption and delays.285 The West of England Partnership has also 
pursued improving railways services over both existing and disused lines around the 
city with its MetroWest project.286 These projects all show that the original ideas of the 
Avon Metro to reduce traffic congestion in the urban centre, provide an effective 
transport network and utilise to a much greater capacity the railway infrastructure 
around the city, continue to be pursued to this day. 
 
Conclusions from this thesis 
The overarching contribution to historical scholarship from this thesis is to 
provide an alternative view to the unfolding of urban neoliberalism during this period. 
Whereas Urban Development Corporations were central government appointed 
bodies and the enterprise zones were government policies, the Avon Metro evolved 
into a theoretically more advanced form of neoliberalism that originally envisioned no 
funding and limited involvement from both central or local government at all in urban 
regeneration. It is therefore within this context that the development of ATA really 
represents the purest expression of neoliberal far in advance of what Wetherall argues 
in his work. ATA provided a model for an alternative expression of neoliberalism that 
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has not been studied before. The birth of the concept of this model and its evolution, 
reacting to the local conditions in the city of Bristol, provides new evidence to support 
Peck’s idea that neoliberalism only exists in an impure form, or as a messy hybrid.287 
The work also provides a further development of Brenner and Theodore’s argument 
that neoliberalism relies on the mobilisation of the state, does not exist in a pure state, 
generates path dependant outcomes and evolves.288 This research provides context 
for an alternative model of urban neoliberalism that moved from excluding the tiers of 
local authorities to including them and showed the extremes, and limitations to, the 
neoliberal agenda in a way that has not been shown before.  
This research explored three research questions about the changing nature of 
the city between 1979 and 1992. How the Avon Metro reflected the changing 
environment of governance in the city, what the development of the metro showed 
about the changing nature of the city due to the emergence of neoliberalism and the 
limitations of this agenda and the ways in which the Avon Metro showed a shifting 
attitude towards mobility and the automobile. The work makes the following 
contributions to historical scholarship: 
 The Avon Metro was, throughout its development, always a concept that 
reacted to poor urban transportation and structural problems in finance and 
government in the county of Avon. Whilst at first envisioned to find ways to improve 
the structure from within, by 1987 the project moved to provide an alternative structure. 
This structure reflected the unfolding neoliberal environment and sought to bypass the 
ineffective and underfunded tiers of local government. This reflected a central 
government-led marginalisation of local government and encouragement of private 
                                                             
287 Jamie Peck, Constructions of Neoliberal Reason, (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2010), p.8-9. 




finance but went further by being a private company aiming to take land off the City 
Council and not a board appointed by central government like the Urban development 
Corporations. Yet following experience and opposition, the concept evolved again into 
attempting to include both tiers of local government into the project by 1989. This 
showed some of the limitations in the model of trying to do too much against the tiers 
of local government and the conflict this resulted in and more towards a partnership, 
or hybrid model. Reactions by the tiers of local government were therefore important 
as ATA lacked the ability for its proposals to be steamrolled through by central 
government, like the Urban Development Corporations were, due to the concept being 
led by a private company from the outset. What the initial opposition had done however 
was to delay the project so that the economic and political conditions had changed by 
the time that consensus had been reached. Yet even following ATA adopting a hybrid 
model by offering partnership with the tiers of local governance, it still remained a 
radical concept with strong distinctions from other concurrent public transportation 
projects at this time such as the Manchester Metrolink and the Docklands Light 
Railway which both operated under the direction of local government as a private 
company continued to steer the project. ATA’s evolution shows the ‘hybrid’ nature of 
neoliberalism as argued by Peck whereby it is always unfolds in an ‘impure’ form, the 
reactions to local conditions as argued by Brenner and Theordore in its initial concept 
as a way to solve the problems of financing and in its reaction to hostility by the tiers 
of government and the requirement for a ‘man of vision’ as argued by Harvey with 
Cottrell steering and promoting the project .289 ATA therefore provided an essential 
experiment in how far neoliberal ideas could be used during this time but was beaten 
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more by the changing conditions than by a failure in its model. It was when conditions 
changed that the concept fell apart. 
The work identifies the changing nature of governance during this period from 
the problems caused by the long-term ramifications of the Local Government Act 
(1974) to the attempts to solve these through private finance and the eventual 
acceptance of the role of private finance by those once bitterly opposed to it. This 
shows the importance of the long-term failures of this act in holding back the effective 
development of the city of Bristol due to the creation of an ineffective structure as there 
was a lack of co-ordination and financing as a result. The changing nature of this 
opposition can be seen by the DLP’s strong initial opposition to ATA based on its 
neoliberal foundations but eventually dropping its opposition and even privatising 
Bristol’s Port as these ideas came to be accepted. Yet limitations to this changing 
nature of governance is also seen as shown by the inability of central government to 
provide ATA with a grant due to legislation for the provision of grants not keeping pace 
with what ATA’s private model. Another limitation is the exposure of purely privately 
financed projects to market conditions due to the delay in funding due to the recession. 
This shows that relying on private finance and enterprise alone is very tricky for mass 
urban transportation systems. Despite these failures there are several clear successes 
that were a result of this model. By resurrecting the methodology used to authorise the 
construction of the original railway network, ATA were able to show that there was an 
alternative way of developing urban transportation projects. Bristol City Council 




pioneer a transport plan for the area and dictate the terms of the public debate when 
providing evidence to the Local Government Commission in 1992.290  
The concept also helped to make the tiers of local government take the impact 
of the car seriously and begin attempts to alleviate this as seen by the restoration of 
Queen Square and the adoption by Avon County Council of LRT as policy. The Avon 
Metro created a discussion within the city for the first time about the need to improve 
public transportation and highlighted the role that disused railway lines could play in 
this. The Avon Metro also had an impact nationally being the first modern metro 
system designed to mitigate the problems of congestion something which all 
subsequent metro systems developed also adopted, the importance of this has not 
been identified previously. Additionally, by promoting a concept led by a private 
company, ATA unleashed market conditions and competition into urban transport 
infrastructure that eventually contributed to its own demise as other companies 
stepped forward offering competing proposals that could be implemented at a lower 
cost. The metro also had another role in helping to shape the tactics and direction of 
the cycling advocacy movement which eventually resulted in the railway path 
becoming the first section of the national cycle network to protect this route. As a result, 
cycling policy was directly affected by the metro in providing as model and increased 
role for the potential of cycling within the urban transportation agenda. It is all these 
impacts which could be considered the greatest achievement of the metro despite its 
failures with this research helping the concept to be recognised in its rightful place in 
history. 
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